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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
With the recent rapid development of software technology, safety-critical and security-critical 
software is playing a more important role in people's lives. An example of a safety-critical and 
security-critical system is a smart door system. A smart door system recognizes the users' 
identifications, gives commands to the door to open or close, and also prevents intruders from 
entering [Cook, 2003; Youngblood, 2002; Smart-home project, Finland; Fellbaum and Hampicke]. 
Another example of such a system is the network protocols used to transfer messages between 
spacecrafts, base stations, and satellites in deep space. The messages transferred include uplinked 
commands to spacecraft and downlinked science data and images. Such networks experience 
scheduled intermittent connectivity, long signal delays, and frequent communication interruptions. 
Because of the importance of the data and the commands as well as the severe power and/or memory 
constraints in deep space, the safety and security of these networks need even more attention from 
software engineers. Unfortunately, the highly successful protocols and security strategies of today's 
Internet operate poorly in such environments [Cert et al., 2005; Scott, 2005; Symington, 2005; 
Burlegigh, 2005; Ramada, 2005; Fall, 2005; Warthman, 2003]. 
The importance of system safety and system security has promoted much research on systematic 
techniques to develop complete safety and security requirements [Bosch, 2000; Bass, 2003; Leveson, 
1995; Dehlinger and Lutz, 2004; Dehlinger and Lutz, 2005; Feng and Lutz, 2005; Lu and Lutz, 2002; 
Liu and Lutz, 2005; Crook et al., 2005; Ji.irjens, 2005; Laney and Nuseibeh, 2004; Lin et al., 2003; 
Mead, 2005; Moffett et al., 2004; Stavridou, 1998; Yiega, 2005; Weber, 2005]. Safety requirements 
and security requirements share many similarities. For instance, both are non-functional 
requirements, dealing with threats or risks; both often involve negative requirements that may 
conflict with some important functional requirements; and, both involve requirements for which 
testing alone is insufficient to prove their correctness and completeness [Landwehr, 1984; Leveson, 
2 
1995; Leveson 1986; Stavridou, 1998; Srivatanakul, 2004]. Clearly, each also involves problems and 
techniques that apply specifically to it. 
Several researchers have explored the relationship between safety analysis and security analysis 
and applied the methods used traditionally on each to the other. For example, HAZOP, which has 
been used in safety analysis, is also applied to security analysis [Foster, 2005; Srivatanakul et al., 
2004]. Among the techniques used in the analysis of the software safety, bi-directional analysis has 
shown promise in security requirement analysis [Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. This method 
combines a forward search from potential failure modes to their effects with a backward search from 
feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. The forward search is similar to a 
Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMEA); the backward search is similar to a Software 
Fault Tree Analysis (SFT A). The combination of the forward and backward search has proven 
effective in discovering latent safety requirements. 
This thesis uses bi-directional analysis to investigate the requirements for two applications in the 
areas of safety analysis and security analysis. The two contributions of this work both involve the 
application of the bi-directional analysis and develop systematic methods to apply it to these two 
different types of non-functional requirements analysis. The first application, in Chapter 2, is to 
construct a systematic safety requirements analysis technique for a smart door product line. The final 
results include a reusable safety analysis and the discovery of missing safety requirements. The 
second application, in Chapter 3, investigates a systematic security requirements technique for a 
Delay Tolerant Network protocol called the Bundle Protocol. This work improves an existing 
security analysis technique by integrating it with the bi-directional analysis to demonstrate and 
challenge the correctness and completeness of the resulting security requirements specifications. 
This thesis also reports the discovery of missing security requirements and the remediation of the 
security requirements. 
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Both applications explore the technique of applying bi-directional analysis to software safety 
analysis and software security analysis and find that the bi-directional analysis assists in finding 
incorrect and incomplete requirements. 
Product Line Requirements 
Product line Commonality 
and Variability Analysis 
Product line Architecture 
Analysis 
Safety Requirement 
Specification 
Protocol Requirements 
Protocol Problem Frame 
Protocol Requirements 
S pecifica lion 
Security Requirements 
Specification 
Figure I Overview of the Work Presented in the Thesis 
Figure 1 gives an overview of these two portions of work and illustrates the commonalities and 
differences between them. The diamond represents the bi-directional analysis, and the rectangles 
represent other sub-process steps. The connectors show the relationships (the data flow) among sub-
processes . The left side of Figure 1 is the safety requirements analysis technique developed in 
Chapter 2 of this paper; the right side of Figure I is the security analysis technique shown in Chapter 
3 of this paper. 
The difference between the applications lies primarily in the inputs to the bi-directional analysis. 
In the safety requirements analysis, the inputs to the bi-directional analysis are the results from the 
product-line commonality and variability analysis, the product-line architectural design, and the 
product-line safety requirements specifications. However in the security requirements analysis, the 
inputs to the bi-directional analysis are the Problem Frame, the requirements specification, and the 
security requirements specifications [Moffett et al., 2004). 
Note that the connectors between the bi-directional analysis and other processes are double-
arrowed, showing that not only the bi-directional analysis uses other sub-processes' results as input 
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but also that the results from the bi-directional analysis will be input to other processes and help 
develop the completeness and the correctness of other sub-processes. For example, bi-directional 
analysis analyzes the safety requirements specification, and the result of the bi-directional analysis 
will be the remediation of missing or incomplete safety requirements. The rest of this section 
introduces each of these two pieces. 
The work presented in Chapter 2 applies a systematic safety requirements analysis to a safety-
critical product line. A method is constructed to apply bi-directional analysis to the software product 
line. The results show that the bi-directional analysis found missing and incorrect software safety 
requirements and demonstrate that the proposed method can handle the challenges to safety analysis 
posed by variations within a product line. 
A product line is a set of systems developed from a common set of core requirements and sharing 
a suite of common traits among the members [Ardis and Weiss, 1997; Weiss and Lai, 1999]. This 
research describes results from an investigation into how, and to what extent, product-line safety 
analyses can be performed and reused as a product-line asset. Reuse of software assets currently 
includes product-line requirements specifications, product-line core architecture, product-line test 
suites, and product-line performance analyses. This work investigated two major challenges to 
extending the bi-directional analysis method to product lines: how to adequately understand and 
specify the safety consequences of the variations among the members of the product line, and how to 
structure the process such that the safety analysis is derived from, and traceable to, the product-line 
requirements and design. To solve the challenges, the standard artifacts of the product-line domain-
engineering process were used, including: (1) the Commonality and Variability Analysis that 
specifies both the requirements shared by all the systems in the product line and the variations among 
the systems' requirements; (2) the product-line architecture that forms the shared, core software 
architecture for all the systems and supports the required variations; and (3) the product-line use 
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cases and scenarios that specify the range of uses and the sequences of events that some or all of the 
systems in the product line may experience. 
The work presented in Chapter 3 applies the software security requirements analysis to a 
security-critical network protocol called the Bundle Protocol used in a Delay Tolerant Network. 
Here, an extended bi-directional analysis method was developed to assess the correctness and the 
completeness of the security requirements. The results also show how the bi-directional analysis 
found missing and incorrect software security requirements 
A Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is an end-to-end network providing communications m 
challenging environments such as deep space communication or sensor-based networks. Existing 
network protocols are not sufficient to fulfill the requirements associated with the highly stressed 
environments. Research on DTN has produced a DTN architecture and the proposal, specification, 
and implementation for the Bundle Layer Protocol and the LickLider Protocol [Cert et al., 2005; 
Scott, 2005; Symington, 2005; Burlegigh, 2005; Ramada, 2005; Fall, 2005; Warthman, 2003]. 
Because of the importance of the role that security is playing in DTN [Ramada, 2005], a thorough 
analysis of the completeness and correctness of the protocol requirements should be done as early as 
possible. 
The approach that this thesis uses for security requirements analysis is based on the Framework 
of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach (FCSRA) proposed by Moffett, Haley, and 
Nuseibeh [Moffett et al., 2004]. It utilizes Jackson's Problem Frame to analyze system functional 
requirements and security goals and to lead to the security requirements specifications [Moffett et al., 
2004]. The Problem Frame illustrates the machine (software system)'s behavior through specifying 
the interactions between the machine and other environment component (domains) around the 
machine and provides a means of analyzing and decomposing problems [Jackson, 2001; Haley et al., 
2004]. 
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Although the FCSRA approach has the advantages of being easy to apply and understand, 
traceable, and reusable, it has the drawback that it does not give a convincing demonstration of the 
correctness of the resulting security requirements specification. To address this point, the work 
reported here applied an extended bi-directional analysis and demonstrated some vulnerabilities that 
challenge the trust assumptions of the Problem Frame. Instead of using the standard artifacts of a 
domain engineering process, such as system architecture, use cases, and scenarios, the extended bi-
directional analysis method takes the Problem Frame and the behavior descriptions of the machine as 
input. The results for security showed missing security requirements and proposed four more 
security requirements remediation to prevent damage from message flooding. 
By applying the bi-directional analysis, the work in this paper provides structured methods and 
step-by-step guidelines for improving the safety and security of software. Evaluation of the 
technique showed that the bi-directional analysis can help find incompleteness in the safety 
requirements and the security requirements. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is joint work with R. Lutz and has 
been published in [Journal of Systems and Software, 2005, 78, 111-127]. It develops a systematic 
method to do safety requirements analysis on a product line. Chapter 3 develops a systematic 
method to do security requirements analysis on the Bundle Protocol. 
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CHAPTER 2 BI-DIRECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT LINE 
A paper published in The Journal of Systems and Software1 
Qian Feng2'3 and Robyn R. Lutz4 
Abstract 
As product-line engineering becomes more widespread, more safety-critical software product 
lines are being built. This paper describes a structured method for performing safety analysis on a 
software product line, building on standard product-line assets: product-line requirements, 
architecture, and scenarios. The safety-analysis method is bi-directional in that it combines a 
forward analysi s (from failure modes to effects) with a backward analysis (from hazards to 
contributing causes). Safety-analysis results are converted to XML files to allow automated 
consistency-checking between the forward and backward analysis results and to support reuse of the 
safety-analysis results throughout the product line. The paper demonstrates and evaluates the method 
on a safety-critical product line subsystem, the Door Control System. Results show that the bi-
directional analysis method found both missing and incorrect software safety requirements. Some of 
the new safety requirements affected all the systems in the product line while others affected only 
some of the systems in the product line. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can 
handle the challenges to safety analysis posed by variations within a product line. 
1 Reprinted with permission of J. of Systems and Software, 2005 , 78, 111-127 
2 Graduate student, Department of Computer Science 
3 Primary researcher and author 
4 Author for correspondence 
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1 Overview 
As product-line engineering becomes more common, more safety-critical product lines are being 
built. A product line is a set of systems developed from a common set of core requirements and 
sharing a suite of common traits among the members [Ardis and Weiss, 1997; Weiss and Lai, 1999]. 
Examples of safety-critical product lines include embedded medical devices such as pacemakers, 
space telescopes, power-plant control systems, and some industrial robots. 
The potential for reuse among the systems in a software product line extends beyond code reuse. 
Reuse of software assets currently includes product-line requirements specifications, product-line 
core architecture, product-line test suites and product-line performance analyses. 
This paper describes results from an investigation into how, and to what extent, product-line 
safety analyses can be performed and reused as a product-line asset. That is, we are interested in the 
potential for reuse of the safety analysis among the members of a safety-critical product line. The 
motivation for this research is to improve the safety-analysis techniques available to developers of 
commercial, safety-critical product lines. 
It is important to note that safety is a property of a single system, not of a set of systems. Thus, 
any safety analysis done during the early domain engineering of the product line (i.e., when the entire 
product line is being defined) must be re-evaluated, adjusted, and completed during application 
engineering (i.e., when each individual system is built). Some preliminary results regarding the reuse 
of safety analyses during application engineering have appeared in [Dehlinger and Lutz, 2004; Lu 
and Lutz, 2002]. In this paper we focus instead on the process of developing a product-line safety 
analysis for the domain engineering phase of safety-critical software product lines. 
The paper extends the Bi-directional analysis (BOSA) method [Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997] to 
product lines. The BOSA method combines a forward search from potential failure modes to their 
effects with a backward search from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. The 
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forward search is similar to a Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMEA); the backward 
search is similar to a Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFT A). The combination of the forward and 
backward search has proven effective in discovering latent safety requirements. 
The work described in this paper investigates two major challenges to extending the BOSA 
method to product lines: how to adequately understand and specify the safety consequences of the 
variations among the members of the product line, and how to structure the process such that the 
safety analysis is derived from, and traceable to, the product-line requirements and design. 
In order to address these challenges in a way that is likely to be used by industry, the safety-
analysis method presented in this paper is grounded in the standard artifacts of the product-line 
domain-engineering process. These domain-engineering assets are: (1) the Commonality and 
Variability Analysis that specifies both the requirements shared by all the systems in the product line 
and the variations among the systems' requirements; (2) the product-line architecture that forms the 
shared, core software architecture for all the systems and supports the required variations; and (3) the 
product-line use cases and scenarios that specify the range of uses and the sequences of events that 
some or all of the systems in the product line may experience. 
Grounding the safety analysis in the domain-engineering products has several benefits. First, it 
supports documented traceability from the extended commonality analysis to the safety analysis and 
is requisite for future automated updating of the safety analysis as the product line evolves. Second, 
linking the safety analysis to the products that capture the subtleties of the domain provides more 
complete handling of variations, the rationales for the variations and the consequences of the 
variations in the safety analysis. Third, using standard domain-engineering assets promotes readier 
adoption of the safety-analysis method by companies building safety-critical, software product lines 
and can lower the cost of performing enhanced safety analyses on these product lines. The first two 
benefits are demonstrated in the paper by application of the safety-analysis method to the Door 
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Control System, a safety-critical subsystem of the Smart Home product line. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the analysis method developed in this paper with the Extended 
Commonality Analysis driving the bi-directional analysis in the lower half of the figure. Our method 
consists of seven steps: 
Step 1: Performed Commonality and Variability Analysis to specify the requirements for the 
given product line. 
Step 2: Developed the architectural design and sequence diagrams from the product-line 
requirements. 
Step 3: Extended the Commonality and Variability Analysis based on the results of the 
Commonality and Variability Analysis and the Architecture Design diagrams. 
Step 4: Constructed the Software Fault Tree Analysis from the results of the Extended 
Commonality and Variability Analysis. 
Step 5: Constructed the Software Failure Mode and Effect Analysis from the results of the 
Extended Commonality and Variability Analysis. 
Step 6: Translated the results of the Software Fault Tree Analysis and Software Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis into XML files. 
Step 7: Compared the resulting XML files using Xlinkit. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 
describes the product line commonality and variability analysis. Each step in this and subsequent 
sections is illustrated with examples from the Door Control System. Section 4 shows how to extend 
the commonality analysis with information from the architectural design and the scenarios ' sequence 
diagrams. Section 5 describes how the bi-directional software safety analysis uses the extended 
commonality analysis to guide and structure it. Section 6 evaluates the method, both by automated 
consistency checking of the forward vs. backward safety analysis results, and by discussing the 
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missing or incomplete software safety requirements for the product line found by this method. 
Section 7 briefly summarizes the results and provides some concluding remarks. 
Step 1: Commonality 
and Variability 
Analysis 
Step 4 : 
Software Fault Tree 
Analysis 
l 
Step 6 .a : 
XML 
Bi-Directional Safety Analysts 
Product Linc 
Step 3: 
Extended Commonality 
and Variability Analysis 
Step 7 : 
Software Safety Results 
Step 2 : 
Architecture and 
Sequence Diagrams 
Step 5 : 
Software Failure 
Mode and Effect An•r 
Step 6 .b : 
XML 
Figure 2. An Overview of the Safety Analysis Method 
2 Related work 
The work described here pulls together related work in two main areas: product line engineering 
and software safety. 
In the area of product line engmeenng, our work draws on recent work in product line 
requirements and in product line architectures. We follow Ardis and Weiss, and Weiss and Lai in 
using a Commonality and Variability Analysis to identify and specify product line requirements 
[Ardis and Weiss, 1997; Weiss and Lai, 1999]. Section 3 describes our use of their approach in some 
detail. Our bi-directional analysis method is also compatible with alternative approaches to product 
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line requirements analysis, such as PuLSE [Bayer et al., 1999] and FORM [Kang et al., 1998]. 
However, because these approaches can enforce an ordering on the choices of features when a new 
product line member is built, we prefer the partial ordering of the Commonality and Variability 
Analysis. 
Product line architecture is an extensively studied field. Bosch discusses how to develop the 
architectures to a product line and how to revise the product line architecture for different products. 
After analyzing all the products, an architectural design and its components are developed in three 
steps. The first step is to develop a product line architecture supporting the functional and quality 
requirements of the product line; the second step is to revise the product line architectural design to 
specific designs for different products; and the third step is to evolve the architectural design for new 
requirements and new products [Bosch, 2000] . Bass says a product line architectural design is built 
on the three points of "identifying variation", "supporting variation", and "evaluating for product line 
suitability" . Product line architecture support for variation is represented by "inclusion or omission 
of elements", "inclusion of a different number of replicated elements", and "selection of versions of 
elements that have the same interface but different behavioral or quality attribute characteristics" 
[Bass, 2003]. Egyed points out a product line architecture provides "generic information common" 
to all the products in the product line and includes "a certain amount of ambiguity" in order to 
support variations in the individual product. "An individual architectural design is an instantiation of 
the product line architecture, which is less ambiguous" [Egyed et al., 2000]. The architecture for a 
product line is "a generic architecture from which the individual product architectures can be 
derived" and it provides two fundamental usages : one is the architecture for a whole product line can 
"capture the important aspects of the product line"; the other is an individual product's architecture 
can be instantiated from the product line architecture [Perry, 1998]. A "core" architecture or 
"baseline" architecture can be derived from taking the essential features of the product line [Lutz, 
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2000; Lutz and Gannod, 2003]. An advantage of the "core" product line architecture is that new 
products can be added to the product line as long as they meet the basic design constraints. 
The use of UML, use cases, scenarios, and sequence diagrams has been widely studied for 
product lines. Bayer, e.g., uses scenarios to determine architectural requirements [Bayer et al., 2000]. 
And ClauB extends UML to support feature diagrams and variability in the standard kinds of UML 
diagrams [ClauB, 2001]. The KobrA method is a component-based development for product lines 
and aims at increasing the reuse of the product line. It describes how to use UML diagram model 
components for product lines [Atkinson et al. : 2002]. John and Muthig describe how use cases can be 
applied for modeling the requirements for a system family and how a particular single-system use 
case approach can be extended to capture product line information and especially variability [John 
and Muthig, 2002]. 
Besides product line engineering, the other area of related work for our study was software 
safety, software safety analysis, investigation how software can jeopardize or contribute to the safety 
of a system [Leveson, 1995]. To date, there has been relatively little work directed specifically at the 
challenges of safety-analyses for product line. Initial work by Dehlinger and Lutz [Dehlinger and 
Lutz, 2004], and by Lu and Lutz [Lu and Lutz, 2002] have shown how software fault tree analysis, a 
successful safety analysis technology for single system, can be extended to product lines and reused, 
with caveats, for a new member of the product line. Progress has been made in ensuring that quality 
attributes are preserved in product line [Bass, 2003; Bosch, 2000]. 
Our work differs from previous work in two ways: (l) the focus to date has been on architectural 
analysis rather than on requirements analysis, as we do here, and (2) prior work has not clearly 
distinguished safety from other quality attributes such as performance, modifiability, safety, 
reliability, availability, and testability. Our research emphasizes the safety analysis as a unique 
property that must be assured across the product line. 
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3 Commonality and Variability Analysis 
In this section, we describe Step 1 of the safety-analysis process summarized in Figure 1. This 
step uses the product-line Commonality and Variability Analysis to specify the requirements for the 
product line of interest. 
Safety analysis of a product line begins with analysis of the requirements. A product line is a set 
of products that share common aspects and differ from each other through some variabilities [Ardis 
and Weiss, 1997; Weiss and Lai, 1999]. Through analysis of the requirements specification, we can 
identify software requirements related to safety and analyze them for completeness, consistency, and 
correctness. 
The Commonality and Variability Analysis (CA) of a product line provides a requirements 
specification for the product line. A CA typically includes three parts: terminology, commonalties, 
and variabilities. The terminology is a "dictionary of standard terms"; the commonalities are "a list 
of assumptions that are true for all family members"; the variabilities "define how family members 
may vary" and "the scope of the family by predicting what decisions about family members are likely 
to change over the lifetime of the family" [Ardis and Weiss, 1997; Weiss amd Lai, 1999]. 
We demonstrate our methodology using the Door Control System for a Smart Home. The Door 
Control System is a safety-critical product line in that the software must function correctly to prevent 
intruders from entering and must respond correctly to life-threatening scenarios such as fires. A 
Smart Home system serves as an invisible housekeeper: it has sensors and agents to interact with 
humans and the environment to offer people convenience and safety. For example, the entrance 
doors can be opened only by inputting fingerprints or voiceprints [Cook, 2003; Youngblood, 2002; 
Smart-home project, Finland; Fellbaum and Hampicke]. We restrict our discussion in this paper to a 
Door Control System software product line with three products: a FrontDoor, a BedRoomDoor, and a 
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Securi tyDoor. 
This section provides examples from the Commonality and Variability Analysis for the Door 
Control System product line derived from the detailed descriptions of these three products. The CA 
consists of the terminology used, the commonalities, the variabilities, and the dependencies among 
the variabilities. The dependencies are constraints that the choice of one features places on the 
choices of other features [Doerr, 2002]. Note that we here exclude any non-behavioral 
commonalities and variabilities to focus on the software. The CA serves as a requirement 
specification for the product line and as an input to the product line's architectural design. 
1.1 Terminology 
Table 1 
Terms for Commonality and Variability Analysis 
Name Explanation 
Door alarms The alarm of the door which will be triggered by the illegal entry of the 
door. 
Registration A person's ID (fingerprints or voiceprints) is input to the database to be 
recognized later. (Note that by "fingerprint registration", we mean the 
input of fingerprint images into a database. Some researchers instead use 
"registration" to refer to the "alignment" of a fingerprint image with 
stored images.) 
Recognition The door tests the ID to see if this person has access permission. If so, the 
door will open for this person, otherwise the door will not open. 
Family member A person who has access permission for the FrontDoor 
Correct Person(s) who should be let in upon requesting a door's opening. 
people/person 
Wrong Person(s) who should not be let in upon requesting a door' s opening. 
people/person 
Fire alarm The alarm that indicates the fire 
Forced entry Perceived force from the outside environment to try to break the door or 
the lock, e. g., through impact or pressure on the door's surface above a 
limit. 
lllegal input Wrong ID. 
Lock inside If the door is locked inside, nobody can open the door from outside, even 
if this person belongs to the set of correct people. 
People pass A person's whole body passes the door from one side of the door to the 
other side. 
3.2 
3.3 
16 
Commonalities 
Cl. Accept family members' registration 
C2. Recognize correct people 
C3. Open door for correct people from outside 
C4. Open door for people from inside 
CS. Close door after people pass 
C6. Sound door alarm upon forced entry 
C7. Respond to the fire alarm 
Variabilities 
V 1. Methods of recognition: fingerprint or voiceprint. FrontDoor: fingerprint; BedRoomDoor: 
voiceprint; Security Door: fingerprint and voiceprint. 
V2. Methods of registration: fingerprint or voiceprint. FrontDoor: fingerprint; BedRoomDoor: 
voiceprint; SecurityDoor: fingerprint and voiceprint. 
V3. Whether or not the door can be locked inside. 
V4. Open/close doors when fire alarm on (when BedRoomDoor door and SecurityDoor are 
closed while the fire alarm is on, it will be open by pushing). 
V5. Methods of opening doors inside (weight, oral command, or input IDs). 
V6. Methods of triggering doors' alarm: the FrontDoor's alarm can be triggered by the wrong 
fingerprint input three times; the SecurityDoor's alarm can be triggered by wrong IDs input 
once. The BedRoomDoor's alarm will not be triggered by the wrong fingerprint inputs. 
3.4 Dependencies among variabilities 
(I) The method of recognition must be the same as the method of registration. 
(2) The door's response to the fire alarm is dependent on the method of recognition. 
(3) Whether the door can be locked inside is dependent on the method of recognition. 
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(4) The method of opening the door from inside is dependent on the method of recognition. 
(5) The ways to trigger the door's alarm is dependent on the method of recognition. 
4 Extended Commonality and Variability Analysis Using 
Architecture Design and Sequence Diagrams 
In this section, we describe Step 2 and Step 3 of Figure 2. These steps develop the architectural 
design and sequence diagrams, and use these to extend and refine the Commonality and Variability 
Analysis. 
In order to capture the domain knowledge needed to perform product line safety analysis, 
information about design choices and constraints must be conjoined with the requirements 
specification. In particular, insight into how the system can "go wrong" and into the rationales 
behind the design choices is needed. The components in a system and the communication among 
them can be identified by the architectural design. Since a product line architecture is structured for 
reuse, its specification displays interactions and data transformation in term of handling of potential 
variations among the product line members. These architectural details provide a structure for 
assembling and evaluating the Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis and Software Fault Tree 
Analysis used in the safety analysis in Section 5. Since many safety-related scenarios involve 
particular sequencing of events of interactions, the safety analysis also needs a dynamic view of the 
system's execution. This is achieved by connecting a sequence-diagram perspective to the 
Commonality and Variability Analysis. 
In this section, we introduce a core architecture for the product line and derive indi vidual 
architectures for product line members. We extend the Commonality and Variability Analysis 
developed in Section 3 with information from the architectural design and from the scenarios' 
sequence diagrams. The resulting Extended Commonality and Variability Analysis (XCA) provides 
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the information needed to perform safety analysis on the product line. Furthermore, the XCA 
provides a foundation for reusing the safety analysis for new members of the product line in the 
future. 
4.1 Architecture of DCS product line 
The core architecture for a product line is a generic architecture, which not only captures the 
important common features of the product line, but also can be instantiated to be an individual 
product's architecture [Perry, 1998]. New products are added to the product line and reuse the 
architectural design, corresponding components, and corresponding safety analyses. Figure 3 shows 
a core architectural design for the Door Control System product line. The system is divided into two 
parts. One is the Central Control System; the other part includes the agents that communicate with 
the outside environment to detect changes and to provide required responses. 
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The Central Control System has five components: RegistrationComponent(Regis), 
RecognitionComponent(Recog), IllegaIEntryComponent(IEC), DoorOpenCloseComponent(DOC), 
and FireAlarmController(FAC). The detectors sensing the outside environmental inputs are 
RegistrationDetector, RecognitionDetector, OpenFromlnsideDetector, ForcedEntry Detector, 
PeoplePassDetector, and FireAlarmSensors. The responders that affect the environment are the 
Door' s alarm and the Door (the door's position and the lock status) . There is also a database 
connected to the central Control System that stores the ID data. 
Figure 4 is an individual architecture for the FrontDoor software system derived from the product 
line core architecture. The most obvious difference from the core architecture is that the sensors 
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have been instantiated to some specified detectors. For example, a "RegistrationDetector" in the core 
architecture is instantiated to an "F _registration detector" (Fingerprint) in the FrontDoor, a "V _ 
recognition detector" (Voiceprint) in the BedRoomDoor, and an "FV _registration detector" (both 
fingerprint and voiceprint) in the Security Door. An "F _registration detector" is a camera to catch 
fingerprints; a "V _ recognition detector" is a sound detector to catch voiceprints; and an 
"FV _registration detector" is a detector that catches fingerprints and voiceprints at the same time. 
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Figure. 4. Individual architecture for FrontDoor product 
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Another difference between the FrontDoor architecture and the core architecture is the 
connector m Figure 3 between the RecognitionComponent (Recog) and the 
IllegalEntryComponent (IEC), representing V6 of the variabilities in the Commonality 
Analysis. If there is an illegal ID input, the RecognitionComponent will send a signal to the 
IllegalEntryComponent, which will sound the door's alarm. Thus, the individual architecture 
for the FrontDoor requires an additional connector and some added functionality to generate 
and respond to the message that an illegal entry has been attempted. 
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4.2 Scenarios 
Identification of the data flow and event sequencing is very important to the quality of the safety 
analysis, since our SFT A and SFMEA are built based on the communication of the components in 
the architecture diagrams. Scenarios are sequences of system activities used to illustrate system 
behaviors and "operational instances of system uses" by showing the interactions between the 
objects, including the messages or events flowing between the components [Allenby and Kelly, 
2001; Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2003; Sommerville, 2000]. Through analysis of scenarios and 
construction of the sequence diagrams, we not only obtain a deeper understanding of the product 
line, its requirements specification, architecture, and the interactions between components, but also 
identify all data transferred between components and all events. 
For example, for the Door Control System product line, we derived the following seven use cases 
by associating every commonality and every variability not included in the commonalities with a use 
case. 
1. Registration: registering the users' ID to the Door Control system (from 
Commonality Cl) 
2. Entry: entering the house from the outside (Including recognition from outside, 
opening the door, closing the door after the people pass, also including the illegal 
entrant handling) (from Commonalities C2, C3, CS, and C6) 
3. Exit: exit the house from the inside (Including recognition from inside, opening 
the door, closing the door after the people pass, also including the illegal going 
out handling) (from Commonalities C4, CS, and C6) 
4. Fire alarm: the door's response to the fire alarm (from Commonality C7) 
S. Bolt: lock door from inside (from Variability Y3) 
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Each use case has one main scenario and other miss-use scenarios. The scenarios are represented 
in sequence diagram where the top rectangles represent objects; the dashed Jines connected to objects 
are the temporal "lifelines"; the arrows between the lifelines represent messages being sent between 
the objects; and the boxes on the dashed line are activations, showing the execution of a method in 
response to a message of that object. Figure 5 gives a portion of the sequence diagram for the Entry 
use case, showing the interactions between the components related to this use case and the messages 
transferred between them. This use case - Entry - to which this scenario belongs is safety-critical 
because there are two hazards are associated with it: - Not letting people out when they need to leave 
and Admitting intruders. 
i~ I 
People Pa 
[<>HPS,eosor J 
I 
I DOC subsvstem J 
lose Door 
Figure. 5. Sequence diagram for the Close-Door-After-People-Pass scenario 
Construction of the sequence diagrams not only made us get more understanding about the 
system but also identified a missing connector in the architecture diagram. The communication 
between F _registration detector and RecognitionComponent should be bi-directional, i.e., after the 
RegistrationComponent component has registered or rejected the ID, it should return a signal to the 
F _registration detector regarding success or failure. 
The construction of the sequence diagram also led to the discovery of a need for additional 
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commands: the Lock Door Command (LDComrnand) and the Unlock Door Command 
(ULDCommand). Initially only an Open Door Command (ODCommand) and a Close Door 
Command (CDCommand) were used to control the door's opening and closing. Analysis of the Fire 
Alarm use case showed that to close the door but keep it unlocked in the BedRoomDoor requires two 
pairs of commands. One command opens or closes the door; the other locks or unlocks the door. To 
close a door, the DCS needs to send out the CDComrnand first, followed by the LDCommand; to 
open a door, the DCS needs to send out the ULDCommand first, followed by the ODCommand. 
When the fire alarm is on, the DoorOpenCloseComponent will send out the CDComrnand and the 
ULDCommand to the BedRoomDoor and the SecurityDoor. However, in the FrontDoor, when the 
fire alarm is on, the DoorOpenCloseComponent will send out the ULDCommand and the 
ODCommand. The resulting corrections yielded a more accurate foundation for the subsequent 
Safety Analysis. 
4.3 XCA 
The Extended Commonality and Variability Analysis (XCA) derived from both the CA and the 
architecture and sequence diagrams provides the foundation of the product-line safety analysis. 
The core architectural design and the events common to shared components give 
information about the commonalities for the product line, while the differences between 
individual architectures and the core, as well as the events that are particular to only some 
systems, give additional information about the variabilities. In the XCA we integrate the core 
architecture and common events with the commonalities of the product line. The variations 
of the product architectures from the core architecture and the non-common events are 
likewise associated with the variabilities of the product line. 
First, we obtain events from the sequence diagrams. There are a total of five use cases, each 
represented by several scenarios. Each scenario is composed of several events. In a sequence 
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diagram, every connection between two actors or devices is an event, representing the sending of a 
message from a component and its receipt by another component. Every box on a vertical line 
indicates an internal event, usually the acceptance of a message and the generation of the next 
message within a component. For example, Figure 4 is a sequence diagram for the scenario in which 
the door closes after people pass, which is associated with three components: Object-has-passed 
sensor, DoorOpenCloseComponent (DOC), and Door. The connector between the sensor software 
and the DOC represents the event of sending a signal; the box in SE2 represents the internal events of 
generating the CloseDoorCommand (CDCommand) and the LockDoorCommand (LDCommand). 
For the safety analysis, we operate at a slightly abstract level by combining the receipt of a message, 
the resulting internal event, and the possible subsequent output of a command as one event. For 
example the SFMEA analysis considers three events in the sequence diagram in Figure 4 - SEl , SE2, 
and SE3. 
Second, in order to maintain traceability between the events investigated in the safety analysis 
and the Commonality and Variability Analysis, each commonality in the CA is refined into several 
sub-commonalties associated with the corresponding events. For example, the commonality C5: 
"Close door after people pass" can be expanded into three sub-commonalties according to the three 
events described above. They are: 
CS-1: "The event of a person passing through the door will trigger the activity of the Object-has-
passed sensors, and the sensors software will send out the OHPSignal to the DOC"; 
C5-2: "After the DOC accepts the OHPSignal, the DOC will send out the CloseDoorCommand 
and the LockDoorCommand to the door"; and 
C5-3: "After the door has accepted the CloseDoorCommand, it will be closed and after the door 
has got the LockDoorCommand, its lock will be locked". 
C5-l is a sub-commonality associated with the component Object-has-passed-sensors and the 
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event that the person has passed by . C5-2 is a sub-commonality associated with the component DOC 
and the event of accepting OHPSignal, generating CDCommand and LDCommand, and sending out 
them. C5-3 is a sub-commonality associated with the component Door and the event of accepting 
CDCommand and LDCommand. 
In order to better manage the data, we group the sub-commonalties according to the use-cases to 
which they belong. For example, all the sub-commonalities expanded from C2: "recognize family 
members" and C3: "open door for family members from outside" are grouped together, since they are 
related to the same use case: "Entry". 
Similarly, variabilities are refined into sub-variabilities. The method is slightly different from 
refining commonalities. For each variability we observe from the architectures and the sequence 
diagrams what the rationale is for the existence of that variability. For example, the variability V3 in 
the CA is "whether or not the door can be locked from inside". From examination of the individual 
architectures, we identified the components that allow the door to be locked in some products and not 
in others, i.e., the existence or non-existence of a door-lock button. From examination of the 
sequence diagrams, we found that the sequence diagrams that represent the variabilities have 
different components. In this example, we found that there are two sub-variabilities that determine 
the existence of this initial variability, V3. These are : V3-l : "whether or not there is a inside lock 
door button" and V3-2: "whether or not the DOC component can handle the ButtonPressedSignal". 
Third, we construct the Extended Commonality and Variability Analysis (XCA) with the 
additional architecture and event information needed to support safety analysis. We provide below 
excerpts from the XCA of the Door Control System. 
4.4 Terminology 
Note that we group the terms according to the different use cases: Registration, Entry, Exit, Fire 
Alarm, and Bolt Door. Table 2 shows some terms that represent the data (commands and signals) 
26 
transferred between the components in two representative safety-related situations. The first is a 
safety-critical use case (Fire Alarm) and the second is a safety-critical scenario (Close Door After 
People Pass) of another use case (Entry) that also contains non-safety-critical scenarios. 
Table 2 
Data transferred between components 
Data Name Data Description 
Situation one: Fire Alarm Use Case 
FAOnSignal Fire Alarm-is-on signal 
FARCommand Fire Alarm-response command 
CDCommand Close door command 
ULDCommand Unlock door command 
ODCommand Open door command 
Situation two: "Close door after people pass" scenario in Entry use case 
OHPSignal Object-has-passed signal 
CDCommand Close door command 
LDCommand Lock door command 
4.5 Commonalities 
We here list the sub-commonalties for the two safety-critical situations listed above. 
Use case 6: Fire alarm (C7: The door will respond to the fire alarm) 
C7-1. The doors have a FireAlarmDetector sensor. 
C7-2. The FireAlarmDetector will sense when the fire alarm is triggered and will send a signal to 
the FireAlarmComponent. 
C7-3. After the FireAlarmComponent recenves the fire alarm signal, it sends the 
FireAlarmResponseCommand to the DoorOpenCloseComponent. 
C7-4. The DoorOpenCloseComponent will send out the corresponding commands to the door 
after it has received the FireAlarmResponseCommand. 
Use case 2: Entry (CS: Close door after people passing) 
(Note that we here list only those commonalities related to the safety-critical scenario "Close door 
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after people pass") 
CS-1. The door has a PeoplePassDetector sensor. 
CS-2. The PeoplePassDetector will sense when people have cleared the door and then will send 
out the ObjectHasPassedSignal to the DoorOpenCloseComponent. 
CS-3. After the DoorOpenCloseComponent has accepted the ObjectHasPassedSignal, it will send 
out the CloseDoorComrnand and the LockDoorComrnand, respectively and continuously to 
the door after it gets the ObjectHasPassedSignal. 
CS-4. After the door has received the CloseDoorComrnand it will be closed and after the door 
has received the LockDoorComrnand its lock will be locked. 
4.6 Variabilities 
We list all the variabilities. 
Y 1-1. The RegistrationDetector 1s different in different products: F _registration detector 
(fingerprints) or Y _registration detector (voiceprints) or FY _registration detector (both) 
Y2- l. The RecognitionDetector is different in different products: F _ recognition detector or Y _ 
recognition detector or FY_ recognition detector. 
Y3- l. Whether or not there is an inside lock door button 
Y3-2. Whether or not the DOC can handle the ButtonPressedSignal 
Y4-1. Whether or not the DOC sends out CloseDoorCommand and UnlockDoorCommand, or 
UnlockDoorComrnand and OpenDoorComrnand, to the door after it gets 
FireAlarmResponseCommand 
Y 4-2. Whether or not the door wi II be open or closed after the fire alarm is on. 
Y5-1. The OpenFromlnsideDetector is different in different products: InsideWeightDetector or 
Inside YoiceDetector. 
Y6- l. Whether or not the RecognitionComponent will count the number of illegal IDs that have 
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been input and send out the Illegallnputsignal. 
V6-2. Whether or not the IllegalEntryComponent will accept the IllegallnputSignal form 
RecognitionComponent component. 
4.7 Tag the commonalities and variabilities to the architecture diagram 
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Figure. 6. Architecture of FrontDoor tagged with commonalities and variabilities 
The XCA gives us a clear requirements specification of every component in the DCS. We see 
that even in this simple product line with only a few variabilities, that the variabilities impose 
architectural constraints. To verify the completeness of the XCA, we label the connectors in the 
architecture diagrams with the indices of the associated commonalities and variabilities. Each 
commonality and variability should associate with one or many connectors in the architecture 
diagrams. At the same time, every connector in the architecture diagrams should be tagged ·with one 
or many commonalities or variabilities. Figure 6 shows an architectural design of the FrontDoor 
tagged with the commonalities and the variabilities from the safety-critical situation: the Fire Alarm 
use case and the Close door after people pass scenario. 
By associating the components and connectors m the architecture diagrams with the 
commonalities and variabilities that use them, we capture additional information needed for the 
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safety analysis and establish the architecture as a structuring device to generate the SFT A and 
SFMEA. 
5 Software Safety Analysis 
In the previous section, we described Step 2 and Step 3 of the product-line safety-analysis 
process shown in Figure 1. In this section, we discuss Steps 4-6 of this process, namely the 
production of the safety-analysis artifacts SFT A and SFMEA, and the translation of both into XML. 
The method for software safety analysis of a product line proposed here uses the XCA and a 
hazards list to drive the bi-directional safety analysis. In this section, we first describe the hazard 
analysis and the backward and forward safety analyses. We then describe their translation into XML 
files that serve as reusable assets for the product line. Finally we describe the results of applying our 
method to the Door Control System. 
5.1 Hazard Analysis 
A detailed discussion of the hazard analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, we used a 
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) to identify the following eight hazards [Allenby and Kelly, 
2001]: 
I) Don't let in the correct people. 
2) Let in the wrong people. 
3) Don't let people out. 
4) When the fire alarm is on, the door doesn't response as it should and people inside cannot get 
out. 
5) The door cannot be locked from the inside, so people inside don't have privacy. 
6) The door cannot be opened after it is locked inside, so people cannot get out or get in. 
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5.2 Backward Safety Analysis - Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 
SFT A is a "top-down" safety analysis technique that is used to identify the errors, faults and 
failures that could contribute to hazards. It is a means for analyzing causes of hazards, which are 
identified as the top events. A backward search from the top event is performed to find out 
combinations of contributing causes of the hazards [Leveson, 1995; Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. 
The tree is equivalent to a predicate statement with the nodes connected by AND and OR gates. The 
SFTA is guided by the XCA. 
Every intermediate node is decomposed into sub-trees. The sub-trees contribute to the occurrence 
of the parent. Combination errors include the errors caused by the occurrence of two or more correct 
events at the same time, errors caused by the race conditions of two or more events, errors caused by 
the occurrences of two or more errors at the same time, and errors caused by the handling of two or 
more errors at the same time. Every error is decomposed into sub-trees until the leaf nodes are 
reached. The leaf nodes are analyzed using the failure modes from SFMEA, such as "absent data", 
"incorrect data", "wrong timing of data", "duplicate data", "halt/abnormal termination of event", 
"omission", "incorrect logic/event", and "timing/order", [Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. We 
considered if those failure modes of the data and events that are associated with each component 
could contribute to the errors of the component that were on the bottom of the fault tree. 
We catalog the fault tree's nodes into five types: "Hazard", "Intermediate", "Leaf', 
"ProductsDivision", and "Reused". The root node is level zero; a hazard node is at level one of the 
fault tree. An intermediate node is a node that is not a leaf, a hazard, a reused node, or a 
ProductsDivision node. A leaf node is a node that is at the bottom level of the fault tree. A reused 
node is a shorthand specification of a sub-tree that repeatedly occurs. A ProductsDivision node is a 
node related to the divisions of the tree associated with different products. ProductsDivision nodes 
provide an abstraction of the concrete errors of different products in the nodes of the next level. The 
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advantages of these nodes are the following: 
o Understandability. With these kinds of nodes, we can easily locate the place that the variations 
occur. 
o Reuse and evolution. The sub-tree will be a complete tree for several products with the same 
variability. In this way, we can easily edit and trim the fault tree [Dehlinger and Lutz, 2004]. 
Since every node in the fault tree can be connected to a product or a group (subfamily) of 
products, we tag every node in the fault tree with the appropriate indices of the XCA, so that every 
node in the fault tree is associated with at least one commonality or one variability. The reason for 
the tagging is to make the product line's fault tree easy to understand and easy to edit and prune in 
the future. For example, suppose we want to derive a new product with the additional privacy feature 
of being able to lock the FrontDoor from inside against even people with valid access. In this case, 
we can check the nodes' tags to identify all the nodes marked with the tags of the commonalities and 
variabilities related to Lock-Door-Inside, Fingerprint-Registration and Fingerprint-Recognition. 
We have created an entire fault tree for the Door Control System product line. The root 
node is "Malfunction of the Door Control System" and the nodes in level one are the six 
hazards described above. The nodes in level two are the errors and faults that can contribute 
to the hazards, etc. We omit the fault tree here for space reasons but include pieces of its 
XML representation below. 
5.3 Forward Safety Analysis - Software Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis 
The Software Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (SFMEA) is a bottom-up forward search from 
failure modes associated with data and events to the effects that are caused by those failure modes. 
[Leveson, 1995; Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. The first step is to identify all the components in the 
system, which we have already done through the architecture diagrams. Lutz and Woodhouse [Lutz 
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and Woodhouse, 1997] provide a list of generic failure modes: four associated with data 
communication and four associated with event processing. The four failure modes for data are 
"incorrect value", "absent value", "wrong timing", and "duplicated value". The four failure modes 
for events are "halt/abnormal termination", "omission", "incorrect logic/event", and "timing/order". 
The events are obtained from the sequence diagrams as described in Section 4.2. The data are 
obtained from the architecture diagrams and the sequence diagrams. In the architecture diagrams, the 
communication data is the data transferred along the connectors. In the sequence diagrams, the data 
are transferred between two vertical lines 
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Figure. 7. Mapping data to the architectural design 
The safety analysis groups the data according to the use cases. For example, in the Fire Alarm 
use case group, the data include FireAlarmOnSignal, FireAlarmResponseCommand, 
CloseDoorCommand, UnlockDoorCommand, and OpenDoorCommand. Each data item is essential 
to make this use case occur successfully and no other data is necessary to its occurrence. 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the use case data and the architecture for the use case: 
Fire Alarm use case and the portion of the Entry use case: Close-Door-After-People-Pass scenario. 
By tagging the SFMEA's data with the architectural connectors, we ensure coverage of the data that 
communicate among components. That is, the SFMEA depends on the archi tecture diagrams. 
However, note that different use cases may use the same data. For example, the CloseDoorCommand 
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1s m both the Fire Alarm use case and in the Entry use case. Since both the reasons for the 
generation of these data and the hazards to which they can contribute may differ, we treat data with 
the same name but from different use cases as distinct from each other. 
Table 3 
Schema of SFMEA's data table 
Data Group Product Data Failure Local Effect End Effect Possible 
Item Mode Hazard 
The The name The Incorrect The effect that occurs The system The possible 
hame of of the products' value, absent to the components failure if the hazard that 
he group that name that value, wrong that the datum is local effect happens if the 
fatum. the datum the datum time, or directly associated occurs. end effect 
belongs to. IS duplicated with if the datum is in occurs. 
associated value. the failure mode. 
Table 4 
SFMEA on the OpenDoorCommand of Fire Alarm group 
Data 
Item 
OpenD 
orCo 
mmand 
1mmg 
Duplicate 
Value 
he DoorOpenClose componen hen the fire 
oes not receive 
FireAlarmResponseCommand, 
ut the DoorOpenClose sends 
ut 0 enDoorCommand. 
he DoorOpenClose componen hen the fire 
receives 
ireAlarmResponseCommand, 
ut the DoorOpenClose does 
ot send out 
en DoorCommand. 
oor is incorrectly 
ot opened. 
he DoorOpenClose componen When the fire 
ets in the 
!arm is on 
nd people 
receives the ·!arm is on, the larm is on 
ireAlarmResponseCommand, oor's opening has nd people 
ut the OpenDoorCommand is een delayed for at 
ela ed for at least I min. least for 1 min. 
he DoorOpenClose component 
eceives the 
ireAlarmResponseCommand, 
nd then the DoorOpenClose 
omponent sends out two 
enDoorCommand. 
hen the fire 
rong 
eople. 
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Table 5 
SFMEA on an event for the FrontDoor product in the Fire Alarm use case 
Group Product Event Fault Local Effect End Effect Possible 
type ~azard 
Fire FrontDoor Halt/ Abnormal The DoorOpenCloseComponent The fire alarm is [he fire 
Alarm termination receives the on, but the door ~I arm IS on 
FireAlarmResponseCommand, is incorrectly not and the 
but it does not send out the opened. tpeople cannot 
UnlockDoorCommand and the iexit. 
OpenDoorCommand to the door. 
Omission The DoorOpenCloseComponent When the fire [he fire 
receives the alarm is on, the alarm lS on 
FireAlarmResponseCommand, door is iand the 
but it does not send out the incorrectly not tpeople cannot 
UnlockDoorCommand and the opened. iexit. 
OpenDoorCommand to the door. 
Incorrect The DoorOpenCloseComponent When the fire May let the 
logic/event does not receive alarm is not on, wrong people 
FireAlarmResponseCommand. the door is In. 
But it sends out the incorrectly 
OpenDoorCommand or opened. 
UnlockDoorCommand or both. 
Timing/Order The DOC component receives The fire alarm is When the fire 
the on. The door is alarm is on, 
FireAlarmResponseCommand, unlocked, but it's people cannot 
but sends the incorrectly not exit. 
UnlockDoorCommand later than opened. 
the OpenDoorCommand. 
As shown in Table 3 the schema of our SFMEA data table includes "Index", "Data Item", 
"Group", "Product", "Data Failure Mode", "Description", "Local Effect", "End Effect", and 
"Possible Hazard". 
Note that in every row in the data table, a failure mode of a datum is identified and we assume 
that every other datum is not in any failure mode. In reality, this is not always true . For example, a 
failure of the OpenDoorCommand is probably always associated with a failure of the 
UnlockDoorCommand. However, the SFMEA's event table does consider such combinations of 
errors, as long as these data are in the same event. 
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Table 4 is excerpted from the SFMEA for the OpenDoorCommand in the Fire Alarm use case. 
In our example, we only include one failure effect for each failure mode, although there are several 
effects associated with some failure modes. 
The schema of the event table of SFMEA is similar to the data table's. Table 5 shows a SFMEA 
on an event for the FrontDoor product in the Fire Alarm use case. In this event, the 
DoorOpenCloseComponent receives the FireAlarmResponseCommand, and then generates and sends 
an UnlockDoorCommand and an OpenDoorCommand to the Door. Again, we here show only one 
failure effect per failure mode. 
As in the data table, although the events table may have two or more events with different names 
doing the same thing, we still name them differently because their triggers and potential hazards may 
be different. 
5.4 Convert SFT A and SFMEA to XML files 
In order to make the safety analyses available and reusable when adding new products to the 
product line, we convert the results of the SFTA and the SFMEA into XML fi les in a partially-
automated step. The reasons for selecting XML in this research (e.g., instead of a relational 
database) are as follows: 
Basically, the advantage of XML is that since the output of the SFTA is a tree, it can be readily 
translated into XML by the FaultCat tool. Furthermore, Finally, XML is as easy to manipulate as a 
relational database and as powerful for our purposes. 
I. The result of the SFT A is a fault tree, which is stored as an XML file by the FaultCat tool used 
to construct the fault tree. 
2. The representation of fault trees in XML is becoming fairly standard. For example, the Galileo 
fault tree tool at the University of Virginia uses XML [Sabanosh and Sullivan, 200 I], as do 
commercial fault-tree tools, such as Relex. XML will likely become even more widely accepted 
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m industry as the exchange language for analysis toolsets as XML parsers are built into 
programming languages. 
3. XML representations of fault trees are easy to understand and manipulate, so appeal to software 
developers. For example, the correspondence between the graphical representation of nodes and 
their hierarchy in the XML nodes is clear without training. 
The resulting XML files also allow automated comparison of the two safety analyses . In 
addition, a product line can be expected to evolve over time. The XML representation can be easily 
edited to incorporate changes. 
For example, to build a fault tree for just the product BedRoomDoor, we can partially-
automatically extract those nodes belonging to the BedRoomDoor to build a new fault tree for that 
product. In this way, the reuse of safety analysis of a product line can be achieved more accurately 
and quickly. 
<!ELEMENT fault-tree (node+)> 
<!ELEMENT node (Name, Parent, Gate, Type, Products, ComOrVar, Description, Children)> 
<!ELEMENT Products (Product+)> 
<!ELEMENT Description (Content, KeywordsSet) > 
<!ELEMENT KeywordsSet (Keyword+)> 
<!ELEMENT Children (ChildrenNum, Child+)> 
<!ELEMENT Gate ( "" I "Or"! "And")> 
<!ELEMENT Type ( "Hazard" I "Error" 1 "ProductsDivision" I "Reused")> 
Figure. 8. Wanted XML DTD elements 
We construct the fault tree using the Fault Tree Creation & Analysis Tool (FaultCAT) [Burgess, 
2003], which allows us to draw and edit the fault tree and convert it into an XML file . Because we 
want every node in the fault tree to be an independent node (somewhat similar to [Sabanosh and 
Sullivan, 2001]), we wrote a Java program, which takes as input the original XML file with the 
format from FaultCAT and writes out an XML file with the desired format as shown in Figure 9 in 
DTD format [DTD tutorial]. The advantage of our format is that it is easy to understand and easily 
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program readable. Figure 8 is an example of a leaf node of the Fault Tree in our format. 
<!ELEMENT SFMEA_data (Data+)> 
<!ELEMENT Data (Nodelndex, Datalndex, DataName, DataNameLong, Products, Errors)> 
<!ELEMENT Errors (OneError +) > 
<!ELEMENT OneError (OneErrorlndex, DataFailureMode, Description, LocaIEffect, EndEffect, 
PossibleHazard)> 
<!ELEMENT LocalEffect (Reused I (LocalEffectContent, KeywordsSet) > 
<!ELEMENT EndEffect (Reused I (EndEffectContent, KeywordsSet)) > 
<!ELEMENT KeywordsSet (Keyword+)> 
<Node> 
<Parent> B4</Parent> 
<Name> B38</Name> 
<Type> Error<IType> 
<Gate>Or</Gate> 
<ComOrVar> 
<N ame>Com</Name> 
<Products> 
Figure 9. DTD for SFMEA 
<Product>P _F</Product> 
<Product>P _B</Product> 
</Products> 
</ComOrVar> 
<Description> 
<Content>The DOCSub does not accept OHPSignal. But it sends out the ODCommand. 
So the door is closed before the correct people's passing 
</Content> 
<KeywordSet> 
<Keyword> DOCSub</Keyword> 
<Keyword>does not</Keyword> 
<Keyword>accept</Keyword> 
<Keyword>OHPSignal</Keyword> 
<Keyword>CONDITION</Keyword> 
<Keyword>DOCSub</Keyword> 
<Keyword>sends out</Keyword> 
<Keyword>ODCommand</Keyword> 
</KeywordSet> 
</Description> 
<Children> 
<ChildrenNum>O</ChildrenNum> 
</Children> 
</Node> 
Figure I 0. A node of the SFT A 
For the SFMEA table each data or event is converted into one node of the XML file. Figure I 0 
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gives a description of the XML file of the SFMEA's data table, using DTD [DTD tutorial]. We wrote 
a Java program to transfer the tables of the SFMEA to a XML file using the Java Excel APL 
By partially automated, we mean that the Java programs to translate the XML files and the 
Xlinkit rules to compare the XML files only have to be written once. Subsequently, the programs 
automatically compare and check the files. The advantage of having partially automated comparison 
is that it is significantly faster and lower-cost than manual comparison. 
6 Results and Evaluation 
This section describes Step 7 of the safety-analysis process for product lines that was 
summarized in Figure 1. The section presents and evaluates the results both in terms of the automated 
consistency checking of the forward vs. backward safety analysis results and by discussing the 
missing software safety requirements for the product line found by this method. 
6.1 Consistency Checking of SFTA and SFMEA 
To evaluate the consistency and completeness of the safety analyses, we use partial automation 
to compare the SFTA and SFMEA XML files. The tool that we used to do the comparison of the 
keywords set, called "Xlinkit", can apply rules on multiple XML documents [Nentwich, 2002; 
Nentwich et al., 2002]. To accomplish this we conducted a comparison of SFT A and SFMEA, i.e., 
comparing every node of the fault tree with every failure effect of the SFMEA and vice versa. The 
method of comparison is using the keywords set and Xlinkit. Figure 11 shows a portion of the code 
for the Xlinkit rule that checks if the fault tree's nodes are in the SFMEA's effects. For every node 
in the fault tree for which there exists the same failure effect in the SFMEA data table, the node's 
keywords must exist in the keywords of that failure mode's failure effect and vice versa. 
A keyword of a phrase is a word that is necessary to express the correct meaning of this phrase. 
So, to compare two phrases, we can compare two keyword sets. Our comparison of the SFT A and 
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the SFMEA was based on the assumption that the architectural design used in SFT A and the one 
used in SFMEA are at the same level of detail. More precisely, if the architectural design used in 
SFT A has a component A, then the architectural design used in SFMEA has the same component A; 
if this component A has n number of sub-components in the design used in SFT A, then the 
component A has the same number of sub-components in the design used in SFMEA. 
<or> 
<exists var="oneDataError" in="/SFMEAData/Data/Errors/OneError"> 
<or> 
<and> 
<fora! I var=" oneSFTKeyword" in=" $oneN ode/Descri ption/KeywordSet/Keyword "> 
<exists var=" oneDataLocal Keyword" 
in=" $oneDataError/LocalEff ect/KeywordsSet/Keyword "> 
<equal op I =" $oneDataLocal Keyword/text()" op2=" $oneSFTKeyword/text()" I> 
</exists> 
</forall> 
<forall var=" oneDataLocal Keyword" 
in=" $oneDataError/LocalEff ect/KeywordsSet/Keyword "> 
<exists var="oneSFTKeyword" in="$oneNode/Description/KeywordSet/Keyword"> 
<equal opl="$oneDataLocalKeyword/text()" op2="$oneSFTKeyword/text()" I> 
</exists> 
</forall> 
<land> 
<and> 
</and> 
</or> 
</exists> 
</or> 
Figure. 11. A part of a rule of Xlinkit 
We compared the faults of SFT A and the failure effects from SFMEA from the Fire Alarm use 
case and the "Close-Door-After-People-Pass" safety-critical scenario from the Entry use case. There 
were thirty-eight nodes in the SFTA's Fire Alarm use case and ten nodes in the SFTA's Close-Door-
After-People-Pass scenario. In the corresponding SFMEAs, there were eight data items analyzed and 
thirty-two failure effects; nine events analyzed and seventy-five failure effects. Note that between 
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the data tables and the event tables, there were many redundant failure effects, i.e., some failure 
effects appeared repeatedly. Within failure modes, a small set was identical and some had the same 
mean mg. 
From the comparison using Xlinkit, we found that the SFMEA is more complete than the SFT A 
when both of them were at the same level of detail. Here, the same level of detail refers to the 
architecture level as described above. Seventeen nodes in the fault tree with the type "Error" and 
with the gate "Or" or "And", were not in the SFMEA data table or in the SFMEA event table. After 
checking the seventeen nodes manually, we found that, in fact, fifteen nodes do have corresponding 
effects in the SFMEA. One reason that Xlinkit could not match them is because they had different 
keywords. For example, node B 11 in the SFT A was not found in the SFMEA. The KeywordSet of 
the Bll node in the fault tree included the keywords: "door", "does not", "accept", "CDCommand", 
"door", "close", "without", "people", and "pass". However, after checking manually, we found a 
failure mode in the SFMEA with the KeywordSet containing "door", "does not", "accept", 
"CDCommand", "ULDCommand", "door", "close", and "unlock". Although these two KeywordSets 
were different, they actually described the same fault. Both relate to the undesirable behavior of the 
door closing automatically without having been commanded to close. Another reason that Xlinkit 
could not match some KeywordSets is that in one case, the analyst had inadvertertently omitted a 
pre-condition from the SFT A but included it in the SFMEA. 
We also checked whether the failure effects from the SFMEA matched the faults of th-e SFT A. 
Again we found a significant number of initial mismatches (sixteen failure effects in the event tables 
that were not found in the SFTA and twelve failure effects in the data table that were not found in the 
SFT A, excluding timing errors) . We manually checked to see why those effects were not in the 
SFT A. Half of the mismatches were due to the keywords sets' variability. The others were due to 
the SFMEA being more detailed than the SFT A. For example, only the SFMEA considered the 
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possibility that LockDoorCommand is sent while the CloseDoorCommand is not when the door is 
closed. The SFr A considers the two commands together. 
6.2 Identification of New Safety Requirements 
The application of the safety analysis methodology to the Door Control System product line 
identified some missing safety requirements. Some new requirements were commonalities that 
addressed shared hazards. Other new requirements affected only some products in the product line 
(i.e., were variabilities) . 
An example of a new shared safety requirement came from the forward search that showed that if 
the digitalized fingerprint image data were in the failure mode "incorrect value", this could have the 
effect of letting in intruders. Performing a backward search using the failure mode "incorrect value" 
as the root to find out why it failed to give the correct fingerprint images identified the possible cause 
that the F _ recognition detector does not accept the new input and continues to send out the old data. 
This finding resulted in a new safety-related requirement that sensors must purge old data, thus also 
requiring the addition of an expiration time for all data that is used in a control decision. 
We also found a new safety requirement by inspection of the architecture for race conditions. In 
every product, if a person has passed the door, the Object-has-passed sensors will send out the 
ObjectHasPassedSignal to the DoorOpenClose component, which will then send out a 
CloseDoorCommand and an LockDoorCommand, respectively. This is a correct operation of the 
Door Control System. However, in the FrontDoor product, when the fire alarm is on, the 
FireAlarmDetector will send out the FireAlarmOnSignal to the FireAlarmComponent, which will 
send out the FireAlarmResponseCommand to the DoorOpenCloseComponent. The 
DoorOpenCloseComponent will then send out an UnlockDoorCommand and an OpenDoorCommand 
to the door. 
A race condition can occur if at the moment that a person passes through the door, the fire alarm 
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1s on. If the UnlockDoorCommand and OpenDoorCommand get to the door later, then there is no 
hazard. However, if the CloseDoorCommand and the LockDoorCommand get to the door later, then 
the door will be closed and locked while the fire alarm is on. In the product BedRoomDoor, the 
same race condition can also cause this dangerous behavior when the fire alarm is on. 
To avoid this race condition, a new safety-related behavioral commonality was added to the 
system: after the DoorOpenCloseComponent receives the FireAlarmResponseCommand, it will not 
accept any other commands until the fire alarm is off. This also results in a new requirement for 
additional functionality to move the DoorOpenCloseComponent out of the frozen state. 
Other instances of incompleteness in the product line requirements found by the bi-directional 
safety analyses were that there should be sensors on the edges of the doors to prevent users from 
being pinned and that there should be software time-outs to control the door's opening and closing. 
We also found a missing variability for the BedRoomDoor and the SecurityDoor, i.e., that when the 
fire alarm is on, the door must be unlocked and closed, even if the door's initial state is locked inside. 
Through the safety analysis (specifically the SFMEA) we also discovered a new possible hazard: 
"people are pinned between the doors," common to all the products in the Door Control System 
product line. 
7 Summary 
This paper has presented a method for performing safety analysis on a software product line and 
demonstrated the method on three members of a safety-critical product-line, the Door Control System 
for a SafeHome application subsystem. The work described here extended the product-line 
commonality and variability analysis with domain information from the product-l ine architecture and 
sequence diagrams. The resulting representation, called the Extended Commonality Analysis, was 
then used to guide the bi-directional safety analysis. The intermediate products of the bi-directional 
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safety analysis, SFf A and SFMEA, were converted to XML files and, using rules coded by the 
analyst, automatically compared via the software package, xlinkit. Omissions and inconsistencies 
were then identified and removed, providing a more-thorough safety analysis. Making the safety 
analyses available to the projects as XML files provides an important first step toward partially 
automated updating of safety analyses as requirements evolve, and toward reuse of the safety 
analyses in the application-engineering phase as new systems are built. 
Findings from application of the bi-directional safety-analysis method included new safety-
related software requirements both for all the systems in the product line (commonalities) and for 
only some of the product-line systems (variabilities), as well as discovery of a new hazard, that 
people can be pinned by the door. The paper provides a structured method and step-by-step 
guidelines for deriving a safety analysis from an extended commonality analysis in order to improve 
the safety of the software product line. The method is general, so can help assure the safety of other 
critical product lines. To this end, we are currently investigating the scalability and domain-
independence of the method in an application to a real-world industrial product line. 
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CHAPTER 3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS FOR 
BUNDLE PROTOCOL IN DELAY TOLERANT NETWORK 
Abstract 
Delay Tolerant Network protocols support communication in deep-space environments where 
long signal delay and frequent service interruptions cause standard network protocols to be 
inadequate. A Delay Tolerant Network is potentially susceptible to denial-of-service attacks due to 
the highly variable round-trip communication time, the rarity of the being-able-to-communicate 
period among nodes, the scarcity of memory in nodes, and their lacking computing resources. The 
contribution of this paper is a systematic analysis of the security requirement for the Bundle 
Protocol, the network layer interposed between the transport layer and the router applications to 
handle delays. Our approach extends an existing framework for security requirement with a bi-
directional analysis in order to methodically investigate the correctness and completeness of the 
security requirements of the protocol. Results identify four additional requirements to prevent 
message flooding attacks that would cause a denial of service in Delay Tolerant Networks. 
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1 Overview 
A Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is an end-to-end network providing communications m 
extreme environments such as deep space communication or sensor-based networks. Such network 
experience extremely long signal propagation delays, on the order of seconds, minutes, or hours 
rather than milliseconds, frequent and lengthy interruptions in connectivity, low levels of traffic 
coupled with high rates of transmission error, meager bandwidth and highly asymmetrical data rates. 
Existing protocols for today ' s Internet are not sufficient to fulfill the requirements associated with 
the highly stressed environments [Cert et al., 2005; Scott, 2005; Symington, 2005; Burlegigh, 2005; 
Ramada, 2005; Fall, 2005; Warthman, 2003] . 
The Delay Tolerant network (DTN) architecture was proposed to solve the problems described 
above and to embrace the concepts of occasionally-connected networks that may suffer from frequent 
partitions and that may be comprised of more than one divergent set of network communication 
protocol families. Research on DTN has produced the proposals, the specifications, and the 
implementations of the Bundle Protocol and the LickLider Protocol [Cert et al., 2005; Scott, 2005; 
Symington, 2005; Burlegigh, 2005; Ramada, 2005, Fall, 2005; Warthman, 2003]. Although both 
protocols address security issues, they have not to date been thoroughly analyzed for completeness 
and correctness. Because of the importance of the role that security is playing in DTN [Ramada, 
2005], we believe that this kind of analysis should be done as early as possible. 
The security requirements analysis approach that we use in this research ts based on the 
Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach (FCSRA) proposed by Moffett, 
Haley, and Nuseibeh [Moffett et al., 2004]. This approach shown in Section 3 integrates the 
requirements engineering and security analysis in viewing security requirements as constraints on the 
functional requirements needed to fulfill security goals [Moffett et al., 2004] . It utilizes Jackson ' s 
Problem Frame to analyze system functional requirements and security goals and develops security 
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requirements specifications in the form of a Problem Frame [Jackson, 2001; Moffett et al., 2004]. 
The Problem Frame illustrates the software requirements through specifying the machine 
(software)'s behavior and interactions between the machine and the other domains (environment 
components) and provides a means of analyzing and decomposing requirements [Jackson, 2001; 
Moffett et al., 2004; Harley, 2004]. We introduce the FCSRA in Section 2. 
The benefits of using FCSRA are five-fold: 1) Problem Frame focuses only on requirements. We 
are only interested in the requirements and do not want to bring the architectural design into our 
analysis; 2) Easy to obtain the traceability of security requirements; 3) Easy to maintain with rapid 
evolution expected; 4) Support reuse; and 5) Easy to apply and understand. Each of these benefits 
is described further in Section 5. 
However, the Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach (FCSRA) has the 
weakness that it does not have a convincing method to systematically prove the completeness and the 
correctness of the resulting security requirements specifications. Instead it tries to argue using a 
"correctness argument" to convince others that the proposed machine will ensure the requirements 
[Jackson 200 l; Moffett et al., 2004; Harley, 2005]. To address this weakness, we use an extended bi-
directional analysis to assess the correctness of the result from the FCSRA approach. 
The bi-directional analysis combines a forward search from potential failure modes to their 
effects with a backward search from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. The 
combination of the forward and backward search has proven effective in discovering latent safety 
requirements [Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. 
In the work, instead of using the standard artifacts of a domain engineering process, such as 
system architecture, use cases, and scenarios, the extended bi-directional analysis method takes the 
Problem Frame and the behavior descriptions of the machine as input. Through the application of the 
extended bi-directional analysis we provide a structure to methodically investigate the correctness of 
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the security requirements specification. This also maximizes the coverage of the problem described 
in the Problem Frame. 
This work focuses on the security requirements to prevent denial-of-services attacks, especially 
message flooding. The extended bi-directional analysis method takes the result from the Problem 
Frame and discovered that the denial-of-services will happen if the trust assumptions are violated. A 
trust assumption is a decision about how much and how to trust the properties of domains that make 
up the system [Jackson, 2001; Haley 2004]. An example of a trust assumption is that the DTN users 
shall not be compromised and used maliciously to inject too many messages into the network. 
As the result, we propose four security requirements shown in Section 4.4 to prevent the denial-
of-services caused by compromised satellites or clients. They strengthen the correctness arguments 
of the Problem Frame by weakening the dependence on the required trust assumptions. Finally the 
approach iterates back to the Problem Frame and updates_ the artifacts using the new security 
requirements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background knowledge used 
in the paper: Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts, and Delay Tolerant Network. 
Section 3 walks through the process of security requirements analysis. Section 4 describes the results 
of this approach. Section 5 provides a discussion of the research experience in applying this 
approach. The last section briefly summarizes the results and provides some concluding remarks. 
2 Related work 
The research in this paper primarily uses two pieces of background knowledge: Framework 
of Core Security Artefacts approach and Delay Tolerant Network. 
2.1 Framework of Core Security Artefacts approach 
Recently the security requirement analysis has drawn people's attention with the rapid 
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development both in the software requirements engineering field and in the software security field 
[Van Lamsweerde, 2004; Foster, 2005; Crook et al., 2005; Jtirjens, 2005; Laney and Nuseibeh, 
2004; Lin et al., 2003; Mead, 2005; Moffett et al., 2004; Stavridou, 1998; Viega, 2005; Weber, 
2005]. Jtirjens uses an extensible verification framework for verifying UML models for security 
requirement [Jtirjens, 2005]. Van Lamsweerde presents an approach to the modeling, specification, 
and analysis of application-specific security requirements by constructing an intentional anti-model 
[Van Lamsweerde, 2004]. Foster and Stavridou apply the safety engineering techniques of HAZOP 
to security requirements development [Foster, 2005; Stavridou, 1998]. Ren et al. suggest a 
connector-centric architectural approach to derive and argue the completeness of the security 
requirements [Ren et al., 2005]. Mead and others have proposed a methodology called Security 
Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) to derive security requirements [Mead and Stehney, 
2005]. Weber investigated the completeness analysis of the software security requirements by using 
a Flaw Taxonomy [Weber et al., 2005] 
Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach (FCSRA) is a security 
requirements analysis technique proposed by Moffett, Haley, and Nusiebeth [Moffett, 2004]. It 
develops a systematic method to derive software security requirements. This approach analyzes the 
functional requirements applying Jackson's Problem Frame, and then decomposes the original 
Problem Frame into sub-problems. Jackson suggests that although the decomposition can be based 
on different use-cases, it is not enough to decompose the Problem Frame into sub-problem frames 
[Jackson, 2001 ]. The results of applying a Problem Frame approach are the detailed descriptions of 
the interacting phenomenon between the machine (software) and the domain (software environment) 
to illustrate the behavior of the software. It gives the users the opportunity to focus on smaller 
problems and develop detailed requirements specifications. Note that the authors point out that this 
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FCSRA approach does not have to use the Problem Frame; but that the Problem Frame is the best 
technique that they are aware of. 
To argue the correctness and the completeness of the derived security requirements specification, 
FCSRA uses the correctness arguments and vulnerability analysis to argue that the security 
requirement will fulfill the security goals [Moffett et al. , 2004]. The correctness argument, first 
suggested by Jackson in his Problem Frame [Jackson, 2001], is a description that convinces others 
the proposed machine ensures the requirement is satisfied in the problem domain. Nevertheless, the 
authors point out that one of the difficulties in assessing the correctness argument is the lack of a 
methodical approach to discover security vulnerabilities [Moffett et al., 2004]. Harley argues the 
validity of the correctness arguments by using a structured argument [Harley, 2005]. Other work 
includes discovering vulnerabilities by focusing on trust assumptions and considering the 
consequences of failure of the assumptions [Harley, 2004; Laney, 2004]. 
2.2 Delay Tolerant Network and Bundle Protocol 
Extreme network communication environments are characterized by long signal propagation 
delays, on the order of seconds, minutes, or hours rather than milliseconds; frequent and lengthy 
interruptions in connectivity; low levels of traffic coupled with high rates of transmission error; 
limited bandwidth and highly asymmetrical data transferring rates with a much higher data return rate 
then command rate [Cert et al., 2005; Scott 2005; Symington, 2005; Burlegigh, 2005; Ramada, 2005; 
Fall, 2005; Warthman, 2003]. 
Existing Internet protocols do not work well for the above environments since these 
environments violate the underlying assumptions on which the Internet architecture is built. These 
underlying assumptions are not necessarily true for DTNs. According to [Warthman, 2003], the 
underlying assumptions are: 
• During the communication session an end-to-end path exists between source and destination 
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• The maximum round-trip time over one particular path is not highly variable from packet to 
packet 
• The end-to-end packet and data loss is relatively small 
• All routers and end stations support the TCP/W protocols 
• Applications need not worry about communication performance 
• Endpoint-based security mechanisms are sufficient for meeting most security concerns 
The Bundle Protocol and the Linklider Transmission Protocol are proposed to handle transferring 
messages in network environments with violations of the above assumptions [Scott et al., 2005; 
Symington et al., 2005; Ramadas et al., 2005]. 
The bundle layer proposed in the Bundle Protocol is the end-to-end message-oriented overlay, a 
layer above the transport layers of the networks and below applications. This overlay employs 
persistent storage at DTN nodes, includes a hop-by-hop transfer of reliable delivery responsibility, 
and has optional end-to-end acknowledgement [Scott et al., 2005]. The Licklider Transmission 
Layer serves as a transport layer with the similar functionality of a TCP/W layer. However, it 
provides retransmission-based reliability over links characterized by extremely long message round-
trip times and/or frequent interruptions in connectivity [Ramsdas et al., 2005] . Note that in different 
outer space environments, DTN can choose to use different transport protocols, for example TCP/W 
or Licklider. A convergence layer is proposed to serve as the layer between the bundle layer and the 
transport layer for the purpose of converting different signals from different transport layers to 
unique signals for the bundle layer or vice versa [Cerf et al., 2005]. 
A security mechanism needs to be designed to protect the already-limited DTN infrastructure 
from unauthorized access and usage. The solution cannot be the frequent distribution of a large 
number of certificates and encryption keys across DTN as is done in today's Internet because of the 
high-delay and rare resource and scheduled connections. The Bundle Protocol authentication 
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solution is proposed in [Durst, 2002; Symington, 2005] including the following two points: 
• Only first-hop routers need to cache per-user credential and information and only for adjacent 
users . The credential information includes the user's ID, public/private key, class of service 
level, and expiration time. 
• Downstream routers can rely on the authentication of upstream outers to verify the credential of 
bundle messages. 
This solution provides not only the advantage of storage savings but also an improvement to system 
management. 
This section has provided two pieces of the background knowledge used in this work: 
Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach and Bundle Protocol. We show the 
details of our approach in Section 3 and show how we applied the Framework of Core Security 
Requirements Artefacts approach on the Bundle Protocol and the results in Section 4. 
3 Approach 
Figure 12 gives an overview of the analysis technique developed in this paper. It is modified 
from the Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach (FCSRA) [Moffett et al., 
2004] . The boxes in Figure 12 are the process steps and the artifacts and the lines are the flow of 
data. The dotted lines and boxes represent the extended bi-directional analysis [Feng and Lutz, 2005; 
Lutz and Woodhouse, 1997]. The process steps are listed in Figure 13. Note that Figure 12 also 
illustrates the relationship among the steps and the artifacts by showing how the artifacts interact 
with each other. For example, the combination of the functional requirements resulting from Step 
L.2, the security requirements and the Problem Frame resulting from Step 3, and the correctness 
arguments and trust assumptions from Step 4.1 is the input to Step 4.2 bi-directional analysis. The 
output of Step 4.2 is the discovery of the incompleteness of the security requirements and of 
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remediation, which is input to the Problem Frame and the correctness arguments. In this section we 
introduce the approach used to analyze the security requirements of the Bundle Protocol. 
Step 1. 1 Elicit/Revise 
Application Business 
Goals & Quality 
Goals 
Goals 
Step 1.2 Elicit/Revise 
Functional 
Requirements using 
Problem Frame 
I 
Func~iona l 
Requir~ments 
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Figure 12. Process Overview [Modified from Moffett et al. , 2004) 
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Step 1: System Business Goals and Functional Requirements 
Step 1.1 System Business Goals 
Step 1.2 Functional Requirement: 
Using Problem Frame to decompose the requirements and generate the requirements 
specification. 
Step 2: From System Security Goals to System Security Requirements 
Step 2.1 Security Goals System Security Risk Analysis (Assets & Harm) 
Step 2.1.1 .Asset Identification 
Step 2.1.2 Harm Identification 
Step 2.1.3 Security Goals 
Step 2.2 From Security Goals to Security Requirements 
Step 2.2.1 Validate Security Goal 
Step 2.2.2 Derive Security Requirements 
Step 3: from System Security Requirements to Software Security Specifications 
Step 3.1 Adding constraints (security requirements) to the machine specification or the 
properties of other domains 
Step 3.2 Altering the interactions between domains 
Step 3.3 Introducing additional domains to the problem. 
Step 4: Prove the correctness of the Software Security Specifications 
Step 4. I Correctness arguments 
Step 4.2 Bi-directional analysis 
Step 5: Improved Software Security Specification and improved Problem Frame from the results 
Figure I 3. Process Steps 
4 Results 
We apply the improved Framework of Core Security Requirements Artefacts approach shown in 
Figure I 2 and Figure 13 to the Bundle Protocol. The results are listed step by step. 
Step.1. Identify System Business Goals and Functional Requirements 
This step identifies the business goals and functional requirements for the Bundle Protocol. 
Step.1.1. System business goals 
From the Delay Tolerant Network Document [Cerf et al., 2005] and the Bundle Layer Document 
[Scott et al., 2005], we have concluded the following system business goal for the Bundle Layer: 
Goal I: performs the application layer and forms a store-and-forward overlay network layer to 
provide interoperable communications with and among performance-challenged environments where 
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continuous end-to-end connectivity cannot be assumed [Scott et al., 2005]. 
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Figure 14 Bundle Protocol Problem Frame 
Step.1.2. Functional requirement - using Problem Frame to decompose the 
requirements 
In this step we derive the initial Problem Frame and decompose it into sub-problem frames. 
Step.1.2.1. Initial Problem Frame for Bundle Layer Machine 
Through the analysis of the documents [Scott et al., 2005; Cert at al, 2005), we have discovered 
three domains that are interacting with the bundle layer and derived a Problem Frame for the Bundle 
Protocol shown in Figure 14. The rectangle box with two vertical lines at the left of the figure 
represents the Bundle Layer machine. T he rectangle boxes without vertical lines are the problem 
domains, representing the environment with which the bundle layer machine interacts. The domains 
that the bundle layer are interacting with are the Applications (the software applications in a router), 
the Convergence Layer domain (the layer between the bundle layer and the transport layer), and 
Storage (the storage that stores the bundles and can be accessed by the bundle layer). The solid lines 
a, b, and c connecting the domains and the machine represent the interacting phenomenon (signals 
and events) that occur between the machine and other domains. For example the line "a" between 
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Bundle Layer Machine and Application domain is the interface between them and the phenomenon 
on this line. The following "a 1" and "a2" belong to the phenomenon "a" [Scott et al., 2005; 
Symington et al., 2005]: 
al: the applications send sending-bundles requests to the bundle layer to request the sending of 
bundles; the bundle layer accepts/rejects the requests. 
a2: the bundle layer sends data.indicating signals to the applications to indicate the arrival of the data 
whose destinations are the current routers; the applications accept or reject the data.indicating 
signals. 
The oval shape represents the requirements. The dashed lines "g", "h", and "i" between the 
requirements and the domains represent the requirements references . Each dotted line corresponds to 
some requirement on one or more domains. The functional requirements describing the behaviors of 
the Bundle Layer Machine can then be mapped to those reference lines. Note that in the Problem 
Frame, the behavior of the machine is represented only by the interface phenomenon with its 
environment [Jackson, 2001 ]. For example, one piece of the requirements, that the storage shall store 
the bundles transferred from the bundle layer, can be mapped to the reference line h. 
Step.1.2.2. Decomposition of Problem Frame 
The complexity of the interfaces and references makes it hard to see the required relationships 
between the machine and the problem domains. A good decomposition of the original problem not 
only can help capture the requirements and describe them but also understand them and analyze 
them. A way to decompose the problem is to take advantage of use cases and events, although 
sometimes only using use-cases is not enough to decompose it [Jackson, 200 I]. 
For a typical router in a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) there are two main use cases 
involved with the bundle layer's bundle process [Scott et al 2005; Symington et al. , 2005]. The first 
one is that an application in the router initializes a sending-bundle request to the bundle layer and the 
57 
bundle accepts the request and forwards the bundle to one of its neighbor in its routing table. Note 
that in this work we do not focus on the bundle routing issue, although we have fully realized the 
importance of routing. We name this use case as SENDING. A more detailed description for this 
use case is: 
• The applications of a node in DTN first issues a sending request to the bundle layer 
• Then the bundle layer checks the request to see if it can be granted 
• If the request is granted, the corresponding bundle will be processed and will either be stored and 
sent out later when the connection is available or sent out immediately 
• If the request is not granted, the bundle layer will send an indicator to the application 
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Figure 15. Sub-Problem Use Case SENDING Problem Frame 
The second use case is that the bundle layer accepts and forwards an incoming bundle from the 
convergence layer. We name the second use case as FORWARDING. A more detailed description 
for this use case is: 
• A bundle arrives at the bundle layer from the convergence layer; the bundle will be authenticated 
first 
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• If the bundle's owner is recognized and other credential information is matched the bundle layer 
will accept it, store it in the storage, and forward out later 
• If the bundle's owner is not recognized or other credential information is not matched, the bundle 
layer will not accept it 
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Figure 16. Sub-Problem: Use Case FORWARDING Problem Frame 
We decompose the original Problem Frame in Figure 14 into two sub-Problem Frames according 
to the two use cases and show the resulting sub-Problem Frames in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
Although the resulting machine and the domains in the two Problem Frames appear to be the same as 
the original one, they are different in the machine interfaces with other domains. For example the 
original line "a" is decomposed into two lines "al" and "a2''. The line al in Figure 15 represents the 
phenomenon that the Application domain sends out a bundle-sending request to the bundle layer 
machine and the bundle layer either accepts or rejects it. The line "a2" in Figure 16 is the 
phenomenon that the bundle layer transfers the data indicating acknowledgement to the applications 
and the applications either accepts or reject it. 
Each of the sub-problems can be decomposed into even smaller sub-problems according to the 
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scenarios and events. For example, the use case FORWARDING can be decomposed into a Bundle 
Credential Checking Before Accepting sub-problem, an Accepting and Storing Bundles sub-problem, 
a Routing sub-problem, a Bundle Forwarding sub-problem, and a Local Bundle Delivering sub-
problem. 
Step.1.2.3. Requirements specification for sub-problems 
After the decomposition of the problem, the requirements specification can be derived. The 
requirements specification is described in a formal specification language as suggested in Framework 
of Core Security Requirement Artefacts approach [Moffett et al., 2004; Jackson, 2001] and Moffett 
et al's early work [Moffett et al., 1996]. The typical formats of this specification language are 
format 1: MachineName! {Signals and Events} Shall Cause DomainName! {Signals and Event} 
format 2: DomainName! {Signals and Events} Shall Cause MachineName! {Signals and Event}. 
Format 1 suggests that the signals and the events initialized by the machine shall cause the signals 
and the events of the domain. Format 2 suggests that the signals and the events initialized by the 
domain shall cause the signals and the events of the machine. 
Figure 17 shows a piece of the functional requirements specification for the use case SENDING and 
Figure 18 shows a piece of the requirement specification for the use case FORWARD ING. 
The requirement specification "b2" for the use case FORWARD ING describes the interface 
phenomenon of the Bundle Layer Machine and the Convergence Layer Domain: when a bundle is 
transferred from the Convergence Layer Domain to the Bundle Machine, it shall result in the 
following actions of the bundle layer: 
• The bundle layer shall do a Bundle Credential Validation for the incoming bundles. 
o Bundle authentication checking. If the authentication fails, the bundle shall be discarded 
immediately; or else it shall be processed in the following step. 
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o If the class level of service that the bundle has requested is higher than the class level of 
service that the node has recorded, it shall be discarded immediately; or else continue the 
following step. 
o If the bundle has expired, the bundle shall be discarded immediately; or else it shall be 
processed in the following step. 
• If the incoming bundle requests a bundle reception status report or the current node is the 
destination of the bundle, the bundle layer machine shall generate the bundle reception status and 
send out to the bundle's owner. 
• If the bundle's class of service requests custodial transfer or the bundle's destination is the 
current node, the bundle layer shall transfer the bundle's custody to itself and become the 
bundle's owner. 
• The bundle layer machine shall store the bundle into storage. 
• If the bundle's destination is not the current node, the bundle layer machine shall check the 
routing table and find out the next available chance to forward the bundle. 
al: Application!{ <Signal> Send.request (source communications endpoint ID, destination 
shall cause 
communications endpoint ID, report communications endpoint ID, class of 
service, delivery options, send token binding, application data unit) 
BLM!{ (<Event> Check Credential(the Bundle) ==Correct)=> 
or 
(<Event> Initiate bundle transmission procedures, 
<Signal> SendToken.indication (send token binding, token) 
<Signal> SendError.Indication 
) 
(<Event> Check Credential(the Bundle) ==Incorrect)=> 
(<Event> Discard the data, 
<Signal> SendError.Indication 
) 
Figure 17. Functional Requirements Specification of Use Case SENDING 
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b2: Convergence Layer! {<Signal> bundle} 
Shall Cause 
BLM! {(<Event> Authentication (the Bundle) and 
<Event>Class of Service Level Match( the Bundle) and 
<Event> Expiration Checking (the Bundle) 
) 
( 
Shall Cause 
(the incoming bundle.request (bundle reception status report) or the incoming 
bundle.destination ==the current node)=> 
<Signal> a bundle reception status report 
Bundle.request (class of service requests custodial transfer)=> 
<Event> Bundle custody transfers. 
<Event> Routing Check -> if good to go <Event> forwarding 
! (<Event> Authentication (the Bundle) and 
<Event>Class of Service Level Match (the Bundle) and 
<Event> Expiration Checking (the Bundle) 
) 
Shall Cause 
(<Event> Discard (the Bundle)) 
Figure 18. Functional Requirements Specification of Use Case FORWARDING 
al: Applications! {<Signal> Send.request (source communications endpoint ID, destination 
communications endpoint ID, report communications endpoint ID, class of 
service, delivery options, send token binding, application data unit) 
shall cause 
BLM ! {<Event> Authentication 
<Event> Time Stamp Checking 
<Event>Class of service Checking 
Figure 19. Functional Requirements Specification for the Credential Validation Event of Use 
Case SENDING 
We continue to decompose the two use cases according to the events in each of the use cases. 
We focus on two events "a 1. l" and "b 1.1 " . The event "a I. I" is the initial of step of the use case 
SENDING: the credential validation of the outdoing bundles. Similarly the event "bl. I" is also the 
initial step in the use case FORWARDING. The reason we focus on these is that, because of the 
limited resources in Delay Tolerant Network to prevent the message flooding attack, the messages 
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should be discarded as soon as possible if they are from non-authorized entities (i.e. the initial 
processes should be the most important and main firewall of the security mechanism to prevent the 
message flooding attack). We show "al.I" in Figure 19. 
Note that although FCSRA has defined that Step 1 only analyzes the functional requirements, in 
our application we have included the security requirement - the credential validation. The reason is 
that the Bundle Protocol specification document, on which this work is based, has included the 
security requirements in it [Scott et al., 2005]. The functional requirements and the security 
requirements have been integrated together as a whole and cannot be separated. Furthermore, 
because the authentication is a standard security technique that is used widely for the network, we 
view it as a functional requirement for the Bundle Layer Machine. 
Step.2. From System Security Goals to System Security Requirements 
Step I has decomposed the bundle layer machine into sub-problems and sub-sub-problems and 
generated the functional requirements specifications for each interface phenomenon of the Machine 
and the Domains. Step 2 focuses on the security requirements and modifies the original Problem 
Frames and functional requirements specification given the security requirements as the constraints 
of the Problem Frames. 
Step.2.1. Security Risk Analysis (Assets & Harm) 
In this step, we define the assets and harms. 
Step.2.1.1. Asset Identification 
We identified the parts of the assets that are uplinked commands to spacecraft and downlinked 
science date and images - bundles. 
Step.2.1.2. Harm Identification 
The followings list a part of the hazards identified in this work. 
HJ: Unavailability 
H2: Unauthorized altering; 
H3: Unauthorized disclosure. 
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Because of the limited resources of the Delay Tolerant Network, the unavailability of the service 
is even more likely to happen than in the Internet. Also because of the importance of the bundles, the 
unavailability may cause more damage than it does in the Internet. Thus, in this work we are only 
interested in Hl - unavailability. Furthermore, routers' denial-of-service is one of the harms in the 
unavailability category, which can be caused by message flooding. 
Step.2.1.3. Security Goals 
We identified one of the security goals - SG 1: 
SG 1: Preventing messages flooding attack. 
Step.2.2. From Security Goals to Security Requirements 
First each security goal is examined for possible relevance, and then is analyzed. Finally, the 
security requirements are derived from the security goals. We only consider the SG l security goal in 
our research and from it we derive the following requirements: 
SGJ/SRJ: The bundles shall provide credential information to the bundle layer when it arrives at 
the bundle layer. 
SG1/SR2: The credential information of a user shall be this user's unique identity and nobody 
else shall be able to get information. 
SGJISR3: The bundles from authorized user or nodes shall be accepted; the bundles from non-
legitimated users or nodes shall not be accepted. 
SGJ/SR4: The bundles from authorized users or nodes shall be forwarded out as soon as possible 
according to the user or the node's class of service. 
SC J/SR5: The bundles from legitimate applications in the current node shall be sent out as soon 
as possible according to its class of service; the bundles from non-legitimate applications shall 
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not be sent out. 
SGJISR6: When too many bundles arrive at the bundle layer, the bundle layer shall be able to 
handle them and shall be able to accept and forward the bundles from legitimate users. 
Step.3.From System Security Requirements to Software Security Specifications 
In this step, the security requirements are introduced into the Problem Frame. At the same time, 
the Problem Frame itself may or may not be changed because of the constraints put on the system to 
fulfill the security goals. Furthermore, from the analyses of the Problem Frame, we obtain detailed 
security requirements specifications. 
Step.3.1. Adding constraints to the machine specification or the properties of other 
domains. 
Four security constraints to the bundle layer machine and other domains are derived from the 
SG1/SR1 -SG1/SR6. 
Constraint 1. Before any client (an entity who uses the DTN) uses the Delay Tolerant Network 
service or any satellite can join the network to provide the service, it shall transfer its credential 
information (ID, public/private key, expiration time, maximum class of services) to the adjacent 
satellites that will communicate with it. 
Constraint 2. When any bundle is passed from the convergence layer to the bundle layer or from the 
applications in the router to the bundle layer, the bundle layer shall first check the bundle credential 
at first. If the credential information is not correct, the bundle shall be discarded immediately. 
Constraint 3. The credential information stored in the storage shall be unable to be accessed by any 
other applications in the routers, except for the bundle layer. 
Constraint 4. The only bundles stored in storage shall be the bundles with correct credential. 
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Step.3.2. Altering the interactions between domains and introducing additional domains 
to the problem. 
We modified the initial Problem Frame as a result of applying the four constraints listed above. 
The new Problem Frame is shown in Figure 20. We have added two additional domains in the 
Problem Frame. One of them is another storage called Credentials Storage, which stores the 
credentials for the clients and the neighbor satellites. The Credential Checker Domain is a domain 
decomposed from the Bundle Layer Machine aiming at checking credentials. The Credential Storage 
can only be accessed by the Credential Checker Domain. 
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Figure 20. Problem Frame for Bundle Protocol with Security Requirements 
In addition to the new domains, a trust assumption is put on the Credential Storage domain that 
the data stored in the credential storage is secured and will not be able to be accessed by a third party. 
Trust Assumptions are the claims about the behavior or the membership of domains included in the 
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system, where the claims are made in order to satisfy a security requirement. [Harley et al. 2004]. 
Figure 21 is a piece of the security requirements specification for the new Credential Storage. 
We claim that the new Problem Frame satisfies the four constraints listed in the step 3.1. 
b: Convergence Layer! { <Signal> Bundle} 
Shall Cause 
Bundle Machine! { 
<Event> Defragment (Message) and obtain the bundle header 
<Signal> the bundle header 
<event> Credential Checking 
e: Credential-Checking! {<Signal> an ID and the class of the service} 
Shall Cause 
Credential Storage { 
if (existing(ID) in the Credential Database)=> 
{<Signal> User Public Key, <Signal> User Credentials, 
<Signal>timestamp } 
else 
{<Signal> NO } 
e: Credential Storage! {No} 
Shall Cause 
Credential-Checking Machine! { 
<Event> Discard the Bundle immediately, 
<Signal> NO} 
e: Credential Storage! { 
<Signal> User Public Key, 
<Signal> User Credentials, 
<Signal>timestamp } 
Shall Cause 
Credential Checking Machine! { 
<Event> CheckValid (User Public Key, User Credentials, Signature, 
Destination, Class of Service) 
Shall Cause 
<Event> Pass the bundle to the Bundle Processing Domain 
else shall cause 
<Event> Discard the bundle 
Figure 21. Security Requirements Specification for Credential Validation for the Incoming Bundles 
Step.4. Prove the correctness of the Software Security Specifications 
The goal of Step 4 is to assess the correctness and the completeness of those security 
specifications (i.e., they would fulfill the security goal). Since we only focus on the goal SG I of 
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preventing the message flooding attacks, this section only discuss the correctness arguments related 
to SGl. 
Step.4.1. Correctness arguments 
The correctness argument claims that the Problem Frame's domains, interactions and 
specification will satisfy the system requirements [Jackson, 2001]. It includes a positive argument 
and a negative argument. The positive argument attempts to argue why the Problem Frame satisfies 
the requirements; the negative argument tests the Problem Frame by searching for contradictions to 
the argument [Moffett, 2004]. In the case of security requirements the contradictions are called 
vulnerabilities. Lamsweerde [Lamsweerde, 2004] describes how a piece of vulnerability can be 
discovered by negating the requirement and then attempting to show that the negation of the 
requirement can be satisfied. 
The positive correctness argument to argue that the Problem Frame will be able to prevent 
message flooding attack is the following: 
• Only bundles with correct credential are only those bundles that can be stored in the storage 
The negative argument is: 
• The bundles with incorrect credentials are the only bundles that are discarded. 
The above two arguments are true if and only if the following trust assumptions are true: 
Trust Assumption TAJ: The users will not abuse their credentials in the Delay Tolerant Network 
(i.e., they will not launch a message flooding attack). 
Trust Assumption TA2: The credential of a user or a node will not be given or be obtained by a 
malicious third party. 
Step.4.2. Bi-directional Analysis 
To assess the correctness arguments the Framework of Core Security Requirement Artefacts 
approach (FCSRA) [Moffett et al., 2004] suggests that the vulnerability analysis will be a good 
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option to find weaknesses in a design. At the same time, their other work suggests that the trust 
assumptions provide a focus point for discovering vulnerabilities by considering the consequences of 
failure of the assumptions [Harley, 2004; Laney, 2004]. 
In the work we use the extended bi-directional analysis to launch a vulnerability analysis. The 
bi-directional analysis combines a forward analysis (from failure modes to effects) with a backward 
analysis (from hazards to contributing causes). It starts with Software Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (SFMEA) and finds out what are the failure effects if any of the events and data is in failure 
modes. Then the failure modes are taken as the root nodes of fault trees [Lutz and Woodhouse, 
1997]. In this work we extended the bi-directional analysis by taking the result of the Problem Frame 
and the security requirements specification as its input and analyzing each of the events and the 
signals one the machine and domain interfaces. This provides a systematic structure to start the 
correctness analysis and the assurance of maximum coverage of the problem. 
Step.4.2.1. Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMEA) analyzes the failure modes of the data 
and events and their corresponding effects. Usually the data and events input to the SFMEA are 
derived from software architectural design : the data are the data interacting between the components 
and the events are the events that occur in the components. In this work we extend bi-directional 
analysis by taking the signals and events from the interfaces of the machine as inputs. An interface is 
an area where domains and machine connect and communicate. The data used in the SFMEA are the 
signals transmitted through the interface; the events used in event table are the events that occur on 
the interface. 
Table 6 ·A piece of Event Table in the Software Failure Mode arid Effect Analysis 
Event Event Fault Description 
Type 
After the incoming Halt /Abnonnal El . The process of storing the bundle is stud~ 
bundle has been T errninati on hung, or deadlocked. 
authenticated and its 
destination is not the Omission E2. The store of the bundle is omitted. 
current node, the 
bundle layer stores Incorrect Logic El The bundle is stored into an incorrect 
the bundle into the /Event storage Location. 
storage and wait for •••• '"" , .. ,, ...... , m·--·-v•~•Y'- • "" Y~"Y"""''"'"'"' ' Y ~··yw~•·· """~'" · ~·~····· "''"Y"""'YW E4 . TI1e actual storage position is not matching 
the next best chance the storage position that the bundle is recorded. 
to forv,rard the 
bundle out. Timing /Order E5. The store of the bundle is delayed. 
E6. The store of the bundle is done previous 
the authentication of the bundle. 
E7. The storing occurs repeatedly rather than 
regularly. 
E8. TI1e requesting of the bundle storing is so 
often that when the next requesting of the 
storing is happening, the storage is not ready to 
receive it and process it. 
Local Effect 
The bundle is not stored to the 
storage domain. 
The bundle is not stored; 
The bundle is not stored in the 
storage location that the bundle 
layer recorded as. 
The bundle is not stored when the 
bundle layer is trying to access it. 
Non-authenticated bundle could be 
stored. 
~-~-~~,h·~·~-~Aw.~· 
The storage does not have enough 
resources to process the following 
bundles. 
End Effect 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
"~'N·Y-A~Y--~~-  
Denial-of-
Service 
a-. 
'-0 
Table 7 A piece of Dat1 Table in the Software Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
Data Item Data Fault Type Desc11ption 
Bundles passed Absent Data D 1. The bundle is not trans fem cl from the 
from the bundle bundle layer to the bundle storage. 
layer to the storage Incorrect Data D2. \.Vhen the bundle is passed from the bundle 
layer to the bundle storage, the bundle is 
altered incorrectly. 
Timing of Data DJ When the bundles are trnnsferred from tl1e 
Wrong bundle layer machine to the storage, the bundle 
is delayed for a long period of time. 
D4. TI1e bundle layer machine transfers 
unexp e cte cl an10unt of bundles to the storage. 
D5. TI1e bundle is stored in tl1e storage so long 
that it is expired. 
Duplicate Data D6. Redundant copies of bundles are stored in 
t11e storage. 
Local Effect 
TI1e bundle is not stored into 
the storage 
Incorrect bundles are stored. 
When the bundle layer tries to 
search the bundle in the 
storage, it could not find it or 
only obtain wrong data. 
TI1e storage can be occupied 
by spurious bundles. 
TI1e storage becomes 
unavailable because it is full. 
End Effect 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Service 
Denial-of-
Se11Jice 
Denial-of-
Service 
-...) 
0 
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We show a piece of the event table in Table 6. Here the event is "after the incoming bundle has 
been authenticated and its destination is not the current node, the bundle layer stores the bundle into 
the storage and waits for the next best chance to forward the bundle". It occurs between the bundle 
layer machine and the storage domain. For example, one failure mode "El" of the event is "the 
process of storing bundles is stuck, hung, or deadlocked", which leads to the local effect: "the bundle 
is not stored", and then eventually results in the denial of service to this bundle. 
Table 7 shows a piece of the data table in the software failure modes and effect analysis. The 
data is bundles that have been recognized by a legal resource and shall be stored in the storage. For 
example when the data is in an "absent" failure mode, the local effect is "the bundle is not stored into 
the storage" and the end effect is denial-of-service to this bundle. 
Step.4.2.2. Software Fault Tree Analysis 
Any of the failure modes in the SFMEA analysis can be the root node of a software fault tree. 
Through the fault tree analysis the reason of these failure modes can be discovered and remediation 
can be achieved. 
In Figure 22, we show a piece of the Software Fault Tree analysis result. The root of this fault 
tree is the failure mode D3: when the bundles are transferred from the bundle layer machine to the 
storage, the bundle's storing is delayed for a long period of time. The result shows four faults in the 
level 7 - L7.l , L7.2, L7.3, and L7.4 related to the message flooding that could cause the denial of 
service. L7.L and L7.3 are that the clients and the routers are sending too many messages to the 
Delay Tolerant Network, which violates the trust assumption TA I. L 7 .2 and L 7.4 are that the 
compromised clients and the routers are sending too many messages out to the Delay Tolerant 
Network, which violates the trust assumption T A2. 
Step.4.2.3. Remediation 
There are several ways to prevent the hazard in the root of the fault tree from happening, shown 
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as in Figure 22. They include: 
1. Stop the occurrence of the faults on the lowest levels in the fault tree. There are two 
approaches: 
a. The clients and the routers use better security techniques to prevent them from being 
hacked and compromised. However this approach is not related to the Bundle Protocol 
security requirements. Furthermore, it is really hard to know how secure the nodes shall 
be that hackers would not break in. 
b. Control the rate at which the clients and the routers can inject bundles into the Delay 
Tolerant Network traffic. There shall be a maximum rate such that the clients and hops 
can send out bundles and forbid the routers or clients from sending bundles when the rate 
exceeds the maximum rate. 
2. Stopping one child fault from leading to the parent fault in the fault tree: 
a. Stop the fault L4.2 from leading to the fault L3.2 (i.e., when the bundle layer receives an 
overwhelming number of bundles with a rate that it cannot handle, the bundle layer shall 
be able to discard the incoming bundles accordingly). Leveson points out that the 
completeness criteria for requirements analysis includes ensuring the capacity or load of 
the software: "a minimum and maximum load assumption must be specified for every 
interrupted-signaled event whose arrival rate is not dominated (limited) by another type 
of event" [Leveson, 1995]. 
3. Detecting the faults and doing the necessary corrections before it is too late: 
a. Prevent the fault L 1.2 (i .e., there shall be a response when the storage is full) .. Leveson 
suggests that "the response to excessive inputs (violations of load assumptions) must be 
specified" [Leveson, 1995]. 
I 
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We propose the following remediation for the Bundle Protocol requirements according to the 
discussion above: 
Remediation 1. The class of service information in the credential shall include the maximum rate 
at which the clients and the routers inject bundles into the Daley Tolerant Network traffic. 
Remediation 2. The Bundle Layer Machine shall be able to detect the receiving rates from a 
client or a neighbor router. If the client or the neighbor hop transfers too many messages 
within a time period exceeding the maximum rate, the machine shall be able to block the 
communicating channel between itself and the client or the neighbor routers. 
Remediation 3. The bundle layer shall be able to detect the rate at which it injects bundles into 
the Deley Tolerant Network traffic. When the rate exceeds the maximum rate that is defined 
in its class of service level, it shall be able to adjust the injections. 
Remediation 4. The bundle layer shall be able to detect the availability of the storage space and 
delete some bundles when the storage is running out of space. 
Remediation 5. The clients who use the Delay Tolerant Network and the satellites in the Delay 
Tolerant Network shall be certified and accredited regarding to their ability to keep their 
security levels. 
Note that the Flow Control and Congestion Control in the Delay-Tolerant Network are similar to 
the four piece of requirements proposed above [Cerf et al., 2005]. They have been mentioned briefly 
in the document and the authors suggest they have not "reached complete consensus" for the two 
controls and have "unresolved concerns" about them. We also found that the Bundle Protocol 
security document has not mentioned the Flow Control and Congestion Control at all [Scott et al., 
2005]. 
Step.5. Improved Software Security Specification and Improved Problem Frame 
After further analysis of the four pieces of the additional requirements and the Problem Frame, 
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the revised Problem Frame is shown in Figure 24. We have added two more domains to the Problem 
Frame: Bundle Storage Availability Checker and Bundle Transferring Rate Checker. In addition, the 
four pieces of remediation proposed previously have been mapped to the requirement references in 
Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. Improved Problem Frame for Bundle Protocol After 
The new Problem Frame and the remediation have strengthened the trust assumptions TAJ and 
TA2 list in Step 4.1 and at the same time weakened the dependence of the correctness argument on 
the trust assumption. Thus, we believe that the validity of the correctness arguments has been 
strengthened using this approach. 
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5 Discussion 
In the previous section we have presented the results of the improved Framework of the Core 
Security Requirement Artefact Approach. In this section we give a discussion of some issues that we 
encountered in this research, including the benefits of using Framework of the Core Security 
Requirement Artefact Approach, the incompleteness and the ambiguousness of the Delay Tolerant 
Network documents, the complexity of the class of service level, and the bundle authentication 
options. 
5.1 The benefits of using Framework of the Core Security Requirement 
Artefact Approach 
Framework of the Core Security Requirement Artefact Approach (FCSRA) is the main approach 
used in this work. Below, we discuss the reasons for using FCSRA. 
First, this approach uses Problem Frame method, which only analyzes the problem/requirements 
instead of the solution/architecture. Our purpose is to perform analysis on the security requirements 
and we do not want to include the information of the architectural design. Most of the previous 
research on security requirement analysis is based on the architectural design. This was described in 
Section 2. However, since the architectural design is based on the requirements specification and it 
is the result of complete and correct requirements, we want to avoid using it to assess the 
completeness and the correctness of the requirements. The Problem Frame approach gives us 
another option in that we can only consider the problem (i.e., requirements) instead of the solution 
(i.e., architectural design), although we discovered in our research that the Problem Frame and the 
architectural design are connected in some degree and some work has been done to derive the 
Problem Frame from the architectural design [Rapanotti, 2004] . 
Secondly, using Problem Frame to analysis the security requirements is easy to trace and reuse in 
the future. The Problem Frame approach decomposes the requirements into detailed requirements 
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specifications without the result of the architectural design. The ability of the Problem Frame's 
decomposition provides the traceability and the reusability requirements specifications generated 
from the Problem Frame. Due to the quick development of hardware and software, the Delay 
Tolerant Network (DTN) is going to be a rapid evolving system, which will benefit from the 
traceability of the requirements including security requirements'. The decomposition of the problem 
(requirements) gives the big benefit of an easy requirement tracing and reusability. In addition, this 
approach will contribute to the reuse of the DTN software. In outer space, the environments are 
unpredictable, which demands different protocols. For example, the network layer can use TCP/IP 
protocol or LickLider protocols: in earth environment, TCP/IP will be used; in highly delayed 
environment, LickLider protocol is going to be used [Scott et al., 2005]. This results in a protocol 
family. To achieve reuse easily, correctly, and widely, the decomposed problem and the 
corresponding security requirements specifications provide a better and fundamental way. 
However, this approach has a weakness. After the security requirements specification 1s 
constructed, the approach tries to argue its correctness and completeness by using "correctness 
arguments". The correctness argument is unable to convince the users that the resulting security 
requirements specification can fulfill the security goal. It fails to provide convincing data and fails to 
give a complete coverage of the problem. Bi-directional analysis has provided a way to address the 
weakness above and gives the extended Framework of the Core Security Requirement Artefact 
Approach more power. 
5.2 Incompleteness and ambiguousness of the Delay Tolerant Network 
documents 
During our research we have discovered some difficulties in understanding the documents about 
Delay Tolerant Network and its protocols specifications. They have several instances of 
incompleteness and ambiguity. For example, the Flow Control and Congestion Control are 
mentioned in the Delay Tolerant Network Architecture document [Cert et al., 2005], but not in the 
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Bundle Protocol Security Specification document [Symington et al., 2005]. 
One example of ambiguity is that in the Bundle Layer Protocol document [Scott et al., 2005], 
credential registration is not mentioned although the registration is necessary to achieve the security 
goal. The ambiguity is whether the bundle layer handles the credential registration of the clients and 
other neighbor routers or not. 
If it is not the bundle layer that is responsible for the credential registration, then some 
application in the routers shall handle it. Then suppose a bundle of registration targeting the current 
router arrives at the bundle layer. The kind of header this message will carry to let the bundle layer 
recognize it as a registration bundle and continue to pass it to the applications is unclear. This header 
will be some kind of administration header, and the registration application must be able to access 
the Credential Storage, which increases the vulnerability of being compromised and increases the 
level of damage that a compromised router can cause the Delay Tolerant Network. 
Otherwise, if the Bundle Protocol is responsible for the registration, the bundle with the 
registration information needs some special header that would invoke the bundle layer's registration 
process. This special header shall carry some administration keys too, but at the same time there is 
no need for a registration application to access the Credential Storage. 
With the consideration of the high security requirement of the credential storage we believe the 
bundle layer should be responsible for the registration. However, there are still a lot of issues 
regarding this, and we have included this in our future work. 
5.3 The complexity of Class of Service Level 
In Step 4.2.3 , four pieces of additional requirements are proposed for remediation. The first 
remediation is that the class of service information in the credential shall include the maximum rate 
by which the clients and the hops can inject bundles into the Delay Tolerant Network traffic. We 
further propose that the bundle layer can limit the total number of messages of a client or a hop 
80 
transferred within a period of time, instead of rate. For example, the maximum might be five 
messages per day for some client. Satellites with better memory and located in important positions 
(for example, gateways) shall have higher level of messages numbers that could be transferred per 
day. In addition, different outer space environments could have different range requirements. At the 
same time the node will have to judge the priorities of the messages and send out the messages that 
are most important and schedule to delay those messages whose priorities are low. However, 
different hops might adopt different orders to send out the messages 
5.4 Bundle Layer Authentication Options 
The Bundle Protocol authentication solution is: 
• Only first-hop routers need to cache per-user credential and information and only for 
adjacent users 
• Downstream routers can rely on the authentication of upstream routers to verify the 
authenticity of bundle messages 
However, this approach is partially susceptible to compromised routers. Security infrastructures 
are specially needed to detect and prevent the malicious actions from the compromised routers and 
the compromised clients. For example, if an otherwise-legitimate router is compromised, it would be 
able to utilize network resources to send traffic purportedly originating from any user whose identity 
is known to the route [Durst, 2002; Symington, 2005]. 
However, if a message signature is carried end-to-end (an option for DTN security) instead of 
being replaced by the hops' , a legitimate user could repudiate the origin of any traffic generated in 
this manner. Thus, a reasonable trade-off is to admit the possibility that a compromised router could 
launch a denial-of-service attack in order to gain the scalability benefits of not checking end-user 
credentials at every hop. 
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6 Summary 
This work provides a structured method and step-by-step guidelines for deriving a security 
analysis from Problem Frames in order to improve the protocol security. This Chapter has presented 
a systematic method for performing security analysis on a network protocol. The method extended 
the Framework of Core Security Artefacts Analysis with bi-directional safety analysis. The bi-
directional analysis is modified by using the Problem Frame result as input instead of architectural 
design. The results of the Framework of Core Security Artefacts are a Problem Frame, security 
requirements specifications, and the correctness arguments that demonstrate the correctness and 
completeness of the security requirements specifications. The bi-directional analysis checks the 
validity of the correctness argument, questions the trust assumptions, and looks for the vulnerabilities 
of the protocol requirements. Bi-directional analysis provides a way to make the FCSA complete. 
Findings from application of the bi-directional safety-analysis method included four new security-
related requirements. 
lo this work, we take an initial step towards the completeness and the correctness analysis of the 
security requirements of the Bundle Layer Protocols. Currently we are investigating the reusability 
of the analysis result. Furthermore, some interesting events (for example the credential registration) 
are also planned as future work. We hope our research will motivate more study towards application 
of bi-directional analysis both on the software safety analysis and software security analysis. 
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